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~ 1. Summary. The lower court has enjoined enforcement of a 
ilA,4( ~ i S$tA.e' 
\,1 New Hampshire statute making it a crime to obscure the motto 
~i'\11\W• 
~I "Live Free or Die" on a license plate issued by that state. The 
case also presents the question whether one who has been convict~d 





e not attack those convictions, can secure federal relief from 
future prosecutions. 
2. Facts. Appellees are George and Maxine Maynard, husband 
and wife and both Jehovah's Witnesses. They believe that thei r 
governma, t, "Jehovah's Kingdom" offers them "everlasting life," 
and that "[i]t would be contrary to that belief to give up li f e 
for the state, even if it meant living in bondage." As an expression 
of this belief, they have since 1974 covered the state motto 
on the license plates of their two cars with brightly colored 
reflective tape. This puts them in violation of New Hampshire 
RSA 262:27-c: 
(~ 
Any person who .•• knowingly obscures or permits to be obscured 
the J igures or letters on any number plate attached to any motor 
vehicle .•. shall be guilty of~ misdemeanor. 
-
~ 
George has been arrested three times for his crime. Acting prose, 
he explained at each trial his religious motivation, but took 
,;::;::: .....;;, 
no appeal from the convictions that were entered against him 
despite this objection. On the first occasion he was fined $25 
and the fine suspended. On the second he was given a suspended 
sentence of six months and fined $50 more. For refusing to pay the 
accumulated fines he served fifteen days in jail. His third 
conviction was "continued for sentencing," a disposition that 
apparently means no sentence, Mr. Maynard being already in jail 
at the time this third trial began. Maxine has never been arrested, 
although she is part owner of each of the two cars and as such 
subject to prosecution. 
The time in which to appeal the last of George's convictions 
,r - 3. -
( - had expired when the Maynards brought this suit for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against future arrests and prosecutions. 
Their claim is that the enforcement of the statute against them 




Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
3. Decision below. DNH dealt first with the Younger problem. 
There was a clearly sufficient threat of prosecution, but no ---- ----pending prosecution with which to interfere. Huffman v. Pursu~, 
420 U.S. 592 (1975), was distinguished as a case in which state 
appellate remedies were still open to the plaintiff, and the attack 
was on a prior state adjudication. Here, the relief sought was 
"purely prospective." Nor was Mr. Maynard bound by a- state litigation 
of the constitutional issue: "Since the constitutionality of the 
state statutes was not litigated by Mr. Maynard in the state 
misdemeanor proceedings, collateral estoppel principles do not 
preclude this court from considering this issue.'' In any event 
Mrs. Maynard, the subject of no state proceedings of any k had, was -- ------ ____, not barred from federal court. She had her own beliefs, her own 
..- ------------
interest in the cars, and thus was under a "separate threat of 
prosecution." This was not a case ''in which legally distinct 
entities are so closely related that they should all be subject to 
to the Younger considerations which govern any of them." Doran v. 
Salem, Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975) (of three corporations 
engaging in the same conduct, one, the subject of state proceedings , 
could be barred by Younger while the other two were not because 
"the interest of avoidingfonflicting outcomes in litigation of 
similar issues .•. must of necessity be subordinated to the claims 
'T. 
/ - -
- of federalism"). The DC also cited Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452 (1974), in which f ederal relief was sought by two persons 
threatened with state prosecution for handbilling, and only the 
one who had been arrested for the offense was barred by Younger. 
On the merits, the DC found it unnecessary to consider whether 
the challenged statute u~constitutionally compelled the affirmation 
of a particular belief, see West Virginia Bd. of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S . 624 (1943) (pledge of allegiance in public schoo l s), 
although one judge (Bownes) would have rested on this ground. 
It was sufficient that the obscuring of the motto constituted 
symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment. As to the First 
Amendment interest, the DC had no doubt that the Maynards' message 
of strong disagreement with the motto was "philosophical and 
4lt political," and also "likely to be readily understood" by those 
-
who observed the license plates. It thus enjoyed the same protection 
as the wearing of black armbands in Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and the taping of a peace symbol to 
the American flag in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
As an infringement of symbolic speech, the s tatute failed the four-
part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Re8ulation 
must be (1) "within the constitutional power of the government," and 
(2) must "further an important or substantial governmental interest," 
(3) which interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression," and (4) accomplished by an "incidental infringement on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms ... no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.") Insofar as the statute was 
justified by the state's interest in promoting the appreciation of 
5 • .. - -




the suppression of free expression»and therefore failed the t hird 
of O'Brien's tests. Insofar as it was justified by the state's 
interest in facilitating vehicle identification, the statute f ailed 
the fourth of O'Brien's tests. The motto was not necessary to 
identify the car as a New Hampshire vehicle, as proven by the fact 
that only passenger cars are required to carry it. (There was , the 
court noted, no showing that passenger and non-passenger cars 
had the same numbers, so as to make the motto necessary to distinguish 
them.) Citing Spence, supra, at 414 n.8, the court recognized that 
a statute's failure under O'Brien is not necessarily dispositive of 
its validity. The court then stated, however, that "neither of 
the interests New Hampshire has identified is sufficiently weighty 
to justify the interference with plaintiff's protected expression." 
It elaborated to the extent of rejecting the state's argument that 
the Maynards' First Amendment interests were minimal because of the 
alternative means of conveying their message, such as by bumper 
stickers near to, and disclaiming, the license plate motto. This 
argument had been rejected in Spence, supra, at 411 n.4, which in 
turn had quoted Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939): 
"P]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in 
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised 
in some other place." 
The DC therefore granted the requested relief, except that it 
refused to order the state to issue the Maynards 
special plates not bearing the motto. This would be an unnecessary 








4. Contentions. Appellants, officials of the State of New 
Hampshire, contest both rulings of the DC. (1) On the Younge r 
point, they assert that George Maynard "expressly raised" a First 
Amendment defense in his state prosecutions. They argue tha t h is 
failure to pursue state appellate remedies bars a federal adj udication. 
to be 
Appellees answer that there is no state proceeding/protected from 
federal interference by Younger. They distinguish Huffman on 
the groundsthat here the relief sought was entirely prospective, 
and that here there was no "deliberate decision" to bypass 
state appellate remedies in favor of a federal forum. This is 
shown, assertedly, by the fact that George Maynard underwent 
three state prosecutions before filing this suit. Appellees 
further align with the DC's determination that Maxine in any case 
can maintain the suit . 
(2) On the merits, appellants recite the same state interests 
they relied on below. Their principal attack, however, is on the 
"communicative quality" of the prosecuted act. Unlike the acts in 
Spence and Tinker, which derived their expressiveness "from the 
then emotional Vietnam conflict," the obscuring of the motto is 
ambiguous, as is the motto itself. Appellants' acts would be seen 
by the observer as "pure whimsy," which is what they were. At stake 
s" 
~ '°J . are the "vehicle registration systems" of a number of states 
"'°'" k" c, ~c.•\.~~?7· (e._g., North Carolina: "First in Freedom"), not to mention the 
~· " :,'<< national currency Ctn God We Trust") . Appellees align with the 
~ .1, . \.C. 7' 
~IJ}" ~~ DC. 
.,  ".~,, They argue that their conduct was even more expressive than a,t)~~- the acts in Spence and Tinker, which involved no verbal message at 
~ # 








appellees' alternative was the displaying of a slogan they 
conscientiously oppose. 
5. Discussion. (1) In Huffman the plaintiff sought federal 
relief from the state court judgment "immediately," while stat e 
appellate remedies were still available, and the relief sough t 
was directed specifically at that state court judgment--an order 
closing the plaintiff's movie theatre. Here, no further state 
appeal was available and the relief sought was purely prospective, 
having no direct effect on Mr. Maynard's past convictions. This 
case is therefore distinguishable from Huffman as far as Younger --- -- ;.;; 
is concerned. The policies underlying Younger, see Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. at 462, of avoiding disruption and duplication 
of state proceedings do not seem implicated, leaving only the 
danger of "reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to 
enforce constitutional principles." Id. The importance of that 
danger is largely a policy matter, but it does seem that Younger 
could only bar relief here if it is generally to bar federal 
adjudication of a claim that could be taken to a state court. 
Appellees could seek dP-clar atory or injunctive relief in a state 
court, rather than a federal one, but otherwise their only state 
remedy is defense to a state prosecution if one is brought. It does 
not seem that the existence of an unappealed state conviction for 
the same conduct should be dispositive, since the conviction might 
not have been worthwhile appealing if, for example, no sentence was 




Younger doesn't bar Mr. Maynard, however, there is the 
question reserved in Huffman. 420 U.S. at 606 & n.18 . 
' o"' • 
.. ... ' - 8. -
It If appellants are right that because Maynard "hased hi s defense 
<9 
rtSt.cACL- c» t 
"~..I 





[ in state court] upon the First Amendment,,'' andtherefore litigated 
the constitutionality of the statutes, Petn at 12, then collat eral 
estoppel is a potential bar. The issues litigated in state court 
are identical to those in federal court, but the decisive is sues 
are legal ones, to which collateral estoppel does not apply "if 
injustice would result." lB Moore, Federal Practice 4234. A 
sufficient danger of injustice may arise from the facts that (again) 
if estopped , 
the first conviction may not have seemed important, and that/ the 
proponent of a federal claim would be bound by the determination 
of a state court. If the DC is right that the First Amendment 
issue was not litigated in state court, Petn App at 28 n.6, then 
res judicata stands in Mr. Maynard's way only insofar as it bars 
the First Amendment claim because it should have been raised. But 
this se-ems unlikely, for the reasons stated above and also because 
the federal declaratory and injunctive suit is not the same "cause 
of action" as the state prosecution. 
The foregoing is of importance, of course, on~y if Mrs. Maynard 
is barred to the same extent as her husband. The DC is probably 
correct that she is not. The event that gives rise to both 
~
appellants' prosecutions--the existence of the tape on the license 
plates--is the same, but Mrs. Maynard's offense (which could be only 
that she "permit[ted]" tape placed there by Mr. Maynard to remain) 
is nonetheless a distinct offense. It could have been committed, 
for example, while Mr . Maynard was in jail. 
(2) . On the merits, the DC also seems correct. Its determination 




~ .. ' - -
political" communication, and one comprehended as such by the 
observer, would appear to be a factual determination that is 
not clearly erroneous. It also serves to limit the case to a very 
few kinds of license plate defacement. (North Carolina's is 
the only other plate described by appellants as having a political 
or philosophical motto. Closest rival: "Oklahoma is OK.") 
The DC's O'Brien analysis also seems unex ceptionable. The v ehicle 
identification justification is very weak, and the interest o f the 
state in having no defacement of its motto is just the kind of 
The DC's O1Brien analysis also seems unexceptionable. The interest 
in 
of the state/preventing disrespect for its motto is just the kind 
of interest considered inadequate in O'Brien and Spence. The non-
expression related interest of the state in vehicle identification 
- may have some plausibility, in that police will at least be 
• 
distracted by the tape and have to go to more than the usual 
troub,le to verify the car's identity. In this respect the state's 
non-expression related interest is greater than in Spence, where 
the defaced flag had little or no non-expression related function. 
On the other hand the license plates are like the flag in that ~ hey 
are not owned by the state (at least the state does not so claim). 
Inasmuch as the plates carry a verbal message, their defacement 
is perhaps a more significant e x pression than was the defacement of 
the flag in Spence. On the whole, the interference with the 
state's non-ex pre ssion related interest does not seem significant. 
The alleged threat to the national currency is specious. Defacement 
thereof must be prevented in orde r to preserve confidence in its 
authenticity. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
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~~~ G • ~__£ 
On Appeal from the J1nited States D'"lstrict ,.,~··-~ 4st~~°'~~',j,.• 
District of New Hampshire. "Recirculated: ------
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Applying the "freedom of speech" clause of the First 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the judgment of the District Court has granted 
appellees a permanent right to deface the New Hampshire 
license tags affixed to their cars by covering with tape 
the portion bearing the State motto, "Live Free or Die." 
The District Court's reasoning, used to invalidate a New 
Hampshire statute forbidding such defacement, betokens a 
like fate for longstanding federal statutes which prohibit 
the defacing of words such as "In God We Trust" on the 
face of United States currency, or of the eagle in the 
Great Seal of the United States on official passports. 
Because the Court's summary affirmance of this judgment 
to my mind constitutes an extension of our "symbolic 
speech" cases which is at once significant, unarticulated, 
and unwarranted, I dissent. I would note probable juris-








As the Court's opinions in this area amply demonstrate, 
~, Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), any claim 
for First Amendment protection such as that advanced by 
appellees must be measured according to its factual setting 
and against a careful consideration of the State's interest 
in regulating conduct whe'h such regulation is assertedly 
overborne by that Amendment. 
The underlying facts are not disputed. Appellees 
George and Maxine Maynard, married residents of New Hampshire 
and owners of two registered passenger cars, were in possession 
of the State's standard-issue license plates for such vehicles. 
On these plates, typical of some 325,000 so issued by appel-
lant Clarke as Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV), are imprinted by raised letters the words "New Hampshire" 
(bottom), the State's motto, "Live Free or Die" (top), the 
year, and the usual combination of numbers and letters 
matching those appearing on the registration certificate and 
in turn identifying appellees in DMV files as the registered 
owners. As relevant here, sometime in early 1974 appellees 
began placing pieces of reflective, non-transparent red tape 
completely over the motto on the plates attached to their 




highways around Lebanon, New Hampshire. Beginning in late 
1974, George Maynard was arrested and prosecuted three 
times for violating N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 262:27-c (Supp. 
1973), which in pertinent part provides: 
"Any person who knowingly ••• obscures 
or permits to be obscured the figures or 
letters on any number plate attached to 
any motor vehicle ••• shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor." 
The resulting convictions subjected him to both fines and 
y 
incarceration; none was appealed. 
On March 4 1 1975, appellees brought this§ 1983 action 
in the District court. Their principal claim was that 
because they were Jehovah's Witnesses and disagreed with 
the religious and political implications of New Hampshire's 
motto, they had a right under the First Amendment to express 
their own views to the motoring public by obliterating the 
motto and venturing forth on the highway. They prayed for a 
declaration that§ 262:27-c was unconstitutional as applied 
to them, and for injunctive relief against appellant local 
and state officials barring future prosecutions for its 
y 
violation. 
After an initial grant of temporary injunctive relief, 
a three-judge court held a brief evidentiary hearing. Testify-




conflicted with the idea assertedly expressed in the motto, 
namely, that one's political freedom should be valued at 
least as highly as one's life. He stated: "I would rather 
live under bondage and still be alive to be able to enjoy 
my conscience and enjoy life that has everything to offer. 111/ 
tr an smi t ting 
Thus, 11 [b)y taping [the motto) over, 11 he was / both an 
objection on "political grounds" and an expression "publicly 
to let people know of my faith. 11 .1/ Red reflective tape ensured 
that "people will recognize what I am doing," i.e., "bear[ingJ 
4a/ 
witness to the truth of God's kingdom • .,,- Asked whether he, 
as a printer by profession, could counter the perceived 
message of the motto by his own printed bumper sticker, 
Maynard first stated, "Yes, but the State would obj'3ct to 
it , 11 referring to the statement that if he made such a 
bumper sticker it would be "an illustration of a dog 
raising his leg on the State motto.".2/ Pressed, he admitted 
that such a sticker would violate no State law, and proffered 
only that "[iJt wouldn't be very dignified."_§/ 
The State established that another alternative 
was available to appellees. Appellant Clarke stated that 
its operation 
within the usual course of/ the DMV could produce for 
appellees, for a fee of $5.00, one of its "vanity plates" __ ,_,-- j] ,,.,,... 
without the State motto. 
~ 
- -5- -
In defense of its decision to place the State motto 
on the great majority of plates destined for passenger 
carsrthe State offered two rationales, which for 
convenience can be referred to as "communicative" and "func-
tional." Under the first, as summarized by the District Court, 
the State "believ-es that the dissemination of the motto and 
the association of it with New Hampshire serves a number of 
values: fostering appreciation of state history and tradition; 
creating state pride, identity, and individualism; and 
promoting tourism." 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (1976). Under 
the second, supported by the undisputed testimony of appellant --Wooley, the Lebanon chief of police, the presence of the motto 
on almost all passenger cars operates in the contex~ of other 
classes of motor vehicles to determine, at least as an initial 
visual matter, whether the vehicle bearing a particular plate 
~ is properly registered within the class as indicated by the 
~ plate's mar~s. On the basis of this testimony and that 
l ~ of DMV Commissioner Clarke, the District Court found that 
' -' 
~ 
"the presence of the motto on the plates aids in the 
identification of New Hampshire passenger cars." Ibid. 
The District court first held that appellees' ''acts 
of covering the motto ••• constitute symbolic speech 
within the meaning of Tinker [v. Des Moines School District, 
393 u.s. 503 (1969)] and Spence [v. Washington, supra]." Id. ,at D87. 
,. 
- -6- -
Applying the four-part test enunciated by this Court in 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), set 
out in the margin~the District court reasoned that the 
"communicative" interest furthered by the State motto 
was "directly related to the suppression of free expression 
' ~----- ~ 
within the meaning of O'Brien." 406 F.Supp., at 1388. It stated: 
"Although a government may perhaps single 
out certain messages for special protection 
when they appear on 2ublic property, see 
Spene~ [,at 408-409], Spgnce teaches that 
the governmental interest in preventing 
individuals from interfering with the 
communication of the state sponsored 
message by engaging in symbolic expression 
is not an interest that meets the third 
requirement of the O'Brien test." Ibid. 
As to the second, "functional" rationale - concededly un-
related to speech - the District Court held that§ 262:27-c 
failed the fourth tenet of O'Brien: "the defacement statut&'.s 
effect on [appellees'] First Arnend_ment freedoms is certainly 
'greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest'." 
Ibid. 
Since neither interest advanced by the State was found 
to justify the restriction on appellees' right of free 
expression, § 262:27-c was in the District Court's view 
unconstitutional as applied to appellees. Appellants were 
permanently enjoined from prosecuting appellees "for cover-
ing over that portion of their license plates that contains 




This remarkable decree is supported by reasoning which 
11-1 
to me represents either an unparalleled extension of Spence, 
a serious misapplication of O'Brien, or perhaps both. 
Accepting for the moment the proposition that New 
Hampshire's "communicative" interest in disseminating its 
motto is analogous to Washington's interest in preserving the 
flag as a national symbol in Spence, 418 U.S., at 412-415, 
I have serious doubts whether the limited holding in Spence 
is controlling on these facts. First, license plates attached 
to cars driven on the public highway - aside from the question 
to such emblems 
of actual title/- are hardly comparable to a "privately owned 
flag • • • displayed • • • on private property." Id., at 408-
409. Since the communication occurs via the medium of 
property purchased from the State, this case is closer to 
those where the State has dedicated its property for a 
particular purpose and can thus restrain expression thereon 
by a neutral "time, place, and manner" regulation such as 
§ 262:27-c. ~, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 
(1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42 (1966). See 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 
(1975). If the rule in Cox and Adderly applies here, 




motto could be forcefully and legally conveyed by a homemade 
bumper sticker would appear to undercut substantially any 
cl aim that a neutral "place" regulation directed at the 
plate itself cannot be applied constitutionally to their 
competing choice of location. 
If Spence cannot be distinguished on this ground, 
affirmance of the decision below extends Spence into areas 
which I do not think were contemplated by that Court. Granted, 
the license plate here is not completely like "a flag that is 
u. s., 
public property . " 415 / at 409, in that appellees have at least 
a possessory interest as against others. Nevertheless, this 
decision draws into question heretofore ill}questioned pro-
.!Y 
hibitions against defacing "possessory" property like coin, 
currency, and passports, to name but a few. The Court today 
must be prepared to give serious consideration to a First 
Amendment claim that one who sincerely disagreed on political 
national 
or religious grounds with the/ motto "In God We Trust" could 
w 
obliterate it from the face of a one dollar bill. Similarly, 
strong feelings of "hawkish" political sentiment could 
apparently immunize one who blotted out the olive branch 
clenched by the eagle in the United States seal appearing on 
the passport. If by the District Court's holding the Federal 
Government no longer has the power to protect the communicative 
,• 
- -9- -
aspects of its official symbols appearing on such items from 
being wholly displaced by private citizens, then this Court 
should say so only after plenary consideration. 
But even if I am wrong in my reading of Spence, that case 
involved kind of 
neither/nor addressed the/"functional" rationale for§ 262: 
27-c established by the State here. While the District 
Court made a finding that the motto's presence "aids in the 
identification" of properly-registered vehicles, it thereafter 
rejected this concededly valid function as insufficient: 
"That the presence of this motto on the 
license plates is required for identi-
fication is belied by the fact that only 
passenger cars are required ~o ha~e -
license plates that conta i n the motto 
"Live Free o r Die." 406 F. Supp., at 1388 
(emphases added). 
The shift in . focus by the District Court obviously did not 
14/ 
give full weight to the State's contention. 
argue 
As I have noted-;-
it did not / that the motto, any more than the words "New 
Hampshire," was the sine qua non of its identification 
it established ~ 
system. On the contrary,/ its role as a.(7- as one_ 
element in the visual authentication for some 325,000 New 
That showing 
Hampshire registrations. / cannot be so easily dismissed under 
O'Brien. That license plate "fraud" is perhaps not overly 
rampant in that State does not minimize its substantial 





characteristics of what is, after all, the outward sign of 
a license to use its highways. No one would contend, for 
example, that a dollar bill would be any less recognizable 
as such were the words "In God We Trust" inked out, but 
that would not g a insay Congress' power to protect, singly 
or in toto, each facial characteristic of that bill 
irrespective of the claim that a given "communicative" 
characteristic is not "required" for identification. I 
do not read O'Brien as so narrowly restricting legislative 
power in this area. 
Since I believe that the District court's decision can 
be upheld only by combining an extension of Spence with a 
contraction of O' Brien, I would set this case down f.or oral 
argument. 
' ,• 
75-1453 • -FOOTNOTES 
1/I do not here address the separate contention of appellants 
that George Maynard's failure to appeal his convictions, and 
thereby take his First Amendment claim to the New Hampshire 
Supreme court, bars this federal court action under Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592 (1975). Appellee Maxine Maynard, found by the 
District Court to have an ownership interest in the Maynard 
family cars and to be under a separate threat of prosecution, 
argues that at least as to her Younger considerations do not 
bar federal equitable relief. For present purposes, I accept 
the validity of this contention. 
1/Appellees also alleged that §262: 27-c, together with the 
statutory requirement that the standard plates for their cars 
bear the State motto, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263:l (Supp. 
1973), violated their right to be free from "compelled 
affirmations of belief" under West Virginia . Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 & 
n. 9 (1975). The District Court expressly did not reach this 
claim. It did note, however, that the Supreme court of 
New Hampshire had a few years earlier rejected such a claim 





(fn 2 cont.) 
In Hoskin, after first determining that the "letters" referred 
to in§ 262:27-c included the State motto, and that that 
section therefore operated to penalize its obliteration by 
tape, the supreme court rejected the Barnette claim by 
distinguishing the factual setting of license plate display: 
"The Barnette case struck down a compulsory 
oral a nd symbolic declaration of belief. The 
statutes which the defendants attack require 
no such conduct. Their argument proceeds 
upon the hypothesis that the requirement that 
they display the State motto upon vehicles 
registered by them compels them to affirm 
that they believe and support a sentiment or 
sentiments with which they disagree. This 
hypothesis we do not accept. 
. . . . 
"The defendants'membership in a class of 
persons required to display plates bearing 
the State motto carries no implication and 
is subject to no requirement that they 
endorse that motto or profess to adopt it 
is a matter of belief •••• One who 
spends the coin or currency of the United 
States bearing the motto "In God We Trust" 
••• is not understood by others to proclaim 
his belief in [that] sentiment •••• Similarly, 
we think that viewers do not regard the uniform 
words or devices upon registration plates as 
the craftsmanship of the registrants. They are 
known to be officially designed and required 
by the State of origin. The hard fact that a 
registrant must display the plates which the 
State furnished to him if he would operate his 
vehicle is common knowledge. Nothing in the 
statutes of this State preclude him from 
displaying his disagreement with what appears 
thereon provided the methods used do not 
obscure the number plates." Id., 112 N.H., at 
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(fn 2 cont) 
Barnette 
It is not clear whether appellees press this/claim as an 
assertedly alternate basis to support the District Court's 
judgment. See Motion to Dismiss, at 12 & n. 8. Whether or 
not this separate First Amendment theory is properly before 
us, I note only that there is no basis in the record to 
support any factual conclusion that "viewers ••• regard 
[the mottoJ upon [appellees'J registration plates as the 
craftsmanship" of appellees. 295 A.2d, at 457. Quite in 
a contrary direction, Mr. Maynard testified his use of 
tape was necessary to draw attention to his license plate. 
Without the tape, his display of the motto would under 
Hoskin seem neither "personal" nor "communicative." 
1/Transcript of Hearing, September 22, 1975, at 14-15. 
yrd., at 11-12. 
4a/ Id., at 17. - --
.2/Id., at 36. Mr. Maynard offered into evidence an example 
of a bumper sticker he had fashioned previously and attached 
to his car, which to him conveyed a tenet of his religious 
belief. It was not directed at negating the motto on the 
license plate. Id., at 33-34, 36. 
_§/Id., at 36. 
1/N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 260:10-a (Supp. 1973). 
" 
~ ' ,. - -4- -
.§/Seen. 2 supra. 
2/Appellant Clarke, DMV Commissioner, had explained that 
there were numerous special statutory categories of 
vehicles,~, "antique" cars, the license plates for which 
bore in lieu of the State motto a word denoting the 
registration category. By contrast to these special 
categories, a patrolling officer could identify the over-
whelming majority of passenger cars, displaying motto-
bearing plates, as properly registered, at least as a 
matter of visual inspection. Appellant Wooley elaborated 
on direct examination by the State: 
"Q. If a piece of non-transparent tape 
appears across the top of a license 
plate, ••• would you comment upon any 
difficulty you might have in identifying 
that vehicle? 
"A. Yes. The designation has been pointed 
out, such as the word commercial, tractor, 
trailer, antique, these are all visible 
means by which myself, as a police officer, 
would be looking for on a plate attached to 
any vehicle. There are numerous occasions 
where people use what we commonly refer to 
as a screwdriver transfer, where any set of 
plates or plate may be attached to a vehicle 
that is not assigned to that vehicle. The 
specific occasion that I personally was 
involved in was the use of ••• a trailer 
plate attached to a motor vehicle •••• 
The fact that the word 'trailer' was visible 
gave me an immediate indication that that 
plate did, in fact, not belong on a pleasure 
car. And without the words or some dis-
tinguishing marks, it becomes more difficult 
for a police officer to visually look at a 
car and a plate, or wh~tever the vehicle may 






(fn 9 cont) 
Transcript of Hearing, at 68-69. 
may, in fact, belong on that vehicle." I 
Chief Wooley was not cross-examined by appellees. 
w "(W]e think it clear that a government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if 
it is within the constitutional power of 
the Government: if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental 
interest: if the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression: and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that inter-
est." 
!!/I accept for purposes of argument the essentially factual 
conclusion of the District Court that appellees' act of 
covering the motto with reflective tape "was sufficiently 
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the 
scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," and that 
the ir conduct was also "symbolic speech." Spence, 418 u.s., 
at 409. 
W~, 18 u.s.c. §§ 331-333, 499, 500, 1543, 1546. 
11/But see,~, Engel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421, 437-442 & 
n. 5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) • 
.!1/See text and n. 9 supra. 
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
My concurrence in the Court's summary affirmance of 
the District Court's judgment rests largely on my willing-
ness to accept the following finding of fact as not clearly 
erroneous: 
Although- the act oTcovering· the motto 
on a license plate may, in some cases, 
be an act of pure whimsy, it is clear 
that plaintiffs' act of masking the motto 
with reflective red tape is motivated by 
deeply held, fundamentalist religious be-
liefs that death is an unreality for a 
follower of Christ and, to a lesser ex-
tent, that it is wrong to give up one's 
earthly life for the state, even if the 
alternative ·is living in bondage. Plain-
tiffs' act of covering the ''Live Free or 
Die" accomplishes two closely interrelated 
objectives: it relieves them of the burden 
of displaying a message which offends their 
beliefs, and, at the same time and more im-
portantly, ·it communicates their strong dis-
agreement with implications of the message. 
We have no doubt that plaintiffs' interest 
implicates the First Amendment. Whatever 
else may be said about the motto "Live 
Free or Pie", it expresses philosophical 
and political ideas·. Plaintiffs' desire 
not to be aligned ·with these ideas falls r 
within the ambit of the First Amendment. 
For three reasons I am persuaded that an affirmance in this 
case does not presage the demise of official use of words 
such as "In God We Trust" or official use of familiar 
.... . ... No. 75-1- · -
symbols such as "an olive leaf clenched by an eagle." 
First, a finding that a statement on a license 
plate on one's car is tantamount to an affirmation of 
belief can be accepted without adopting a like con-
clusion with respect to the use of money or a visit to 
a public building. 
Second, an affirmation of belief in death con-
flicts more directly with certain specific religious 
faiths than does the motto "In God We Trust" or the 
symbolic eagle. 
Third, the state interest in the unmasked motto 
on its license plates is significantly less than the 
federal interest in the pro~ection of its currency and 
its national monuments. 
There is merit in Justice Rehnquist's view that the case 
should be briefed and argued. However, since there is only 
a finite amount of time available in which we can do our work, 
the Court must exercise ·a measure of discretion in evaluating 
the importance of cases which are fully briefed- and argued, 
even on its mandatory docket. Not without some doubt, I 
the r efore concur in the summary affirmance. 
- 2 -
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My concurrence in the Court's summary affirmance of 
the District Court's judgment rests largely on my willing-
ness to accept the following finding of fact as not clearly 
erroneous: 
Although- the- -act -orc overing· the motto 
on a license plate may, in some cases, 
be an act of pure whimsy, it is clear 
that plaintiffs' act of masking the motto 
with reflective red tape is motivated by 
deeply held, fundamentalist religious be-
liefs that death is an unreality for a 
follower of Christ and, to a lesser ex-
tent, that it is wrong to give up one's 
earthly life for the state, even if the 
alternative ·is living in bondage. Plain-
tiffs' act of covering the ''Live Free or 
Die" accomplishes two closely interrelated ' 
objectives: it relieves them of the burden 
of displaying a message which offends their ' 
beliefs, and, at the same time and more im- 1 
portantly, ·it c_ormnunicates their strong dis- I 
agreement with implications of the message. 
We have no doubt that plaintiffs' interest 
implicates the First .Amendment. Whatever 
else may be said about the motto "Live 
Free or Pie", it expresses philosophical 
and political ideas. Plaintiffs' desire 
not to be aligned ·with these ideas falls ' 
within the ambit of the First Amendment. 
For three reasons I am persuaded that an affirmance in this 
case does not presage the demise of official use of words 
such as "In God We Trust" or official use of familiar 
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symbols such as "an olive leaf clenched by an eagle." 
First, a finding that a statement on a license 
plate on one's car is tantamount to an affirmation of 
belief can be accepted without adopting a like con-
clusion with respect to the use of money or a visit to 
a public building. 
Second, an affirmation of belief in death con-
flicts more directly with certain specific religious 
faiths · than does the motto "In God We Trust" or the 
symbolic eagle. 
Third, the state interest in the unmasked motto 
on its license plates is significantly less than the 
federal interest in the protection of its currency and 
its national monuments. 
There is merit in Justice Rehnquist's view that the case 
should be briefed and argued. However, since there is only 
a finite amount of time available in which we can do our work, 
the Court must exercise ·a measure of discretion in evaluating 
the importance of cases which are fully briefed and argued, 
even on its mandatory docket. Not without some doubt, I 
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June 10, 1976 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
The enclosed draft concurrence is not intended to 
dissuade you from voting to note probable jurisdiction, 
for there is considerable force to Bill's dissent. 
However, I can't get over the fact that the case really 
involves nothing more than the masking of two license 
plates. 
If we do affirm summarily, I would like to avoid 
the risk that I think Bill's dissent creates, that 
lower courts may regard our summary affirrnances as under-
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No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Bill: 
Your dissent bas persuaded me to vote to note in the 
above case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Con£ erence 
' t y ~) 
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- o: The Chief Justio~ ·~ 
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Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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Mr. Justice Stevens 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NEAL R. WOOLEY, ETC., ET AL. V. GEORGE 
MAYNARD ET ux. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
No. 75-1453. Decided June-, 1976 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Applying the "freedom of speech" clause of the First 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment, the judgment of the District Court 
has granted appellees a permanent right to deface the 
New Hampshire li~ense tags affixed to their cars by cov-
ering with tape the portion bearing the State motto, 
"Live Free or Die." The District Court's reasoning, 
used to invalidate a New Hampshire statute forbidding 
such defacement, betokens a like fate for longstanding 
federal statutes which prohibit the defacing of words 
such as "In God We Trust" on the face of United States 
currency, or of the eagle in the Great Seal of the United 
States on official passports. Because the Court's sum-
mary affirmance of this judgment to my mind constitutes 
an extension of our "symbolic speech" cases which is at 
once significant. unarticulated, and unwarranted, I dis-
sent. I would note probable jurisdiction and set the 
case down for oral argument. 
I 
As the Court's op11110ns in this area amply demon-
strate, e. g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), 
any claim for First Amendment protection such as that 
advanced by appellees must be measured according to 
its factual setting and aga.inst a careful consideration 
of the State's interest in regulating conduct when such 
regulation is assertedly overborne by that Amendment. 
, 
•• - -
2 WOOLEY v . MAYNARD 
The underlying facts are not disputed. Appellees 
George and Maxine Maynard, ma.rried residents of New 
Hampshire and owners of two registered passenger cars, 
were in possession of the State's standard-issue license 
plates for such vehicles. On these plates, typical of 
some 325,000 so issued by appellant Clarke as Commis-
sioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) , are 
imprinted by raised letters the words "New Hampshire" 
(bottom), the State's motto, "Live Free or Die" (top) , 
the year, and the usual combination of numbers and let-
ters matching those appearing on the registration certifi-
cate and in turn identifying appellees in DMV files as 
the registered owners. As relevant here, sometime in 
early 1974 appellees began placing pieces of reflective, 
nontransparent red tape completely over the motto on 
the plates attached to their cars, and thereafter pro-
ceeded to drive on the public highways around Lebanon, 
New Hampshire. Beginning in late 1974, George May-
nard was arrested and prosecuted three times for violat-
ing N. H. Rev. Sta.t. Ann. § 262:27- c (Supp. 1973) , 
which in pertinent part provides: 
"Any person who knowingly ... obscures or permits 
to be obscured the figures or letters on any number 
plate attached to any motor vehicle ... shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor." 
The result ing convictions subjected him to both fines 
and incarceration; none was appealed .1 
1 I do not here address the separate content ion of appellants that 
George Maynard's failure to appeal his convictions, and thereby take· 
his First Amendment claim to the New Hampshire Supreme Court , 
bars this federal court action under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37 (1971 ), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) . Ap-
pellee Maxine Maynard, found by the District Court to have an 
ownership interest in the Maynard family ca rs and to be under a 
sepa rate threat of prosecut ion, argues that at least as to her Younger· 
considera tions do not bar federal equitable relief. For present pur-· 





WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 3 
On March 4, 1975, appellees brought this § 1983 action 
in the District Court. Their principal claim was that 
because they were Jehovah 's Witnesses and disagreed 
with the religious and political implications of New 
Hampshire's motto, they had a right under the First 
Amendment to express their own views to the motoring 
public by obliterating the motto and venturing forth on 
the highway. They prayed for a declaration that 
§ 262:27-@was uncom:titutional as applied to them, and 
for injunctive relief against appellant local and state 
officials barring future prosecutions for its violation. 2 
0 Appellees also alleged t hat§ 262:27- c, together with t he statutory 
requirement that the standard plates for their ca rs bear the state 
motto , N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263: 1 (Supp. 1973) , violated their 
right to be free from "compelled affi rmations of belief" under West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). 406 
F. Supp. 1381, 1386 and n. 9 ( 1975). The District Court expressly 
did not reach this claim. It did note. however, t hat the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire had a few years earlier rejected such a 
claim in State v. Hoskin, 112 N. H. 332, 295 A. 2d 454 (1972). 
In Hoskin, after first determining that the "letters" referred to in 
§ 26~7-c included the sta te motto, and that that sect ion therefore 
operated to penalize its obliteration by tape, the supreme court re-
jected the Barnett,._ claim by distinguishing the factual sett ing of 
li cense plate display: 
'·The Barnette case struck down a compulsory oral and symbolic 
declamtion of belief. The statutes which the defendants attack 
require no such conduct. Their argument proceeds upon the hy-
pothesis that the requirement that they display the State motto upon 
vehicles registered by them compels thf'm to affi rm that they be-
lieve and support a sentiment or sentiments with whirh they dis-
agree. This hypothesis we do not accept. 
"The defendants' member8hip in a class of persons required to dis-
play plates bearing the State motto carries no implication and is 
subject to no requirement that the)· endorse that motto or profess to 
adopt it is a matter of belief. . . . One who spends the coin or cur-
rf'ncy of the United States bearing the motto 'In God We Trust' . .. 
is not understood by others to proclaim hi~ belief in [that] senti-
ment. . . Similarly, we think that viewers do not regard the 
uniform words or devicf's upon registration plates as the craftsman-
• -, - -
4 WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 
After an initial grant of temporary injunctive relief, 
a three-judge court held a brief evidentiary hearing. 
Testifying in his behalf, Maynard explained that his 
own beliefs conflicted with the idea assertedly expressed 
in the motto, namely, that one's political freedom 
should be valued at least as highly as one's life. He 
stated: "I would rather live under bondage and still be 
alive to be able to enjoy my conscience an_d enjoy life 
that has everything to off er." 3 Th us, "[b] y ta ping 
[ the motto] over," he was transmitting both an objec-
tion on "political grounds" and an expression "publicly 
to let people know of my faith."" Red reflective tape 
ensured that "people will recognize what I am doing," 
i. e., "bear[ing] witness to the truth of God's King-
dom." 5 Asked whether he, as a printer by profession, 
could counter the perceived message of the motto by his 
own printed bumper sticker, Maynard first stated, "Yes, 
but the State would object to it," referrring to the state-
ship of the registrants. They are known to be officially designed and 
required by the State of origin. The hard fact that a registrant 
must display the plates which the State furnished to him if he would 
1S operate his vehicle ii! common knowledge. Nothing in the statutes 
of this State preclude him from displaying his disagreement with 
what Hppears thereon provided the methods used do not obscure 
the number plates." Id. , 112 N. H., at 336-337, 295 A. 2d, at 
456-457. 
It is not clear whether appellees press this Barnette claim as an as-
sertedly alternate basis to support the District Court's judgment. 
See Motion to Dismiss, at 12 and n. 8. Whether or not this sep-
ara tr First Amendment theory is properly before us, I note only that 
there is no basis in the record to support any factual conclusion that 
"viewers . . . regard [the motto] upon [appellees'J registration 
plates as the craftsmanship" of appellees. 295 A. 2d, at 457. Quite 
in a contrary direction, Mr. Maynard testified his use of tape was 
nrcessa ry to draw attention to his license plate. Without the tape, 
his display of the motto would under Hoskin seem neither "personal" 
nor "communicative." 
3 Transcript of Hearing, September 22, 1975, at 14-15. 
4 Id ., at 11-l 2. 




WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 5 
ment tha,t if he made such a bumper sticker it would be 
"an illustration of a dog raising his leg on the State 
motto." 6 Pressed, he admitted that such a sticker would 
violate no state law, and proffered only that "[i]t 
wouldn't be dignified." 7 
The State established that another alternative was 
available to appellees. Appellant Clarke stated that 
within the usual course of its operation the DMV could 
produce for appellees, for a fee of $5, one of its "vanity 
plates" without the state motto.8 
In defense of its decision to place the state motto 
on the great majority of plates destined for passenger 
cars,9 the State offered two rationales, which for conveni-
ence can be referred to as "communicative" and "func-
tional." Under the first, as summarized by the District 
Court, the State "believes that the dissemination of the 
motto and the association of it with New Hampshire 
serves a number of values: fostering apprecia.tion of 
state history and tradition; creating state pride, identity, 
and individualism; and promoting tourism." 406 F. 
Supp. 1381, 1386 ( 1976). Under the second, supported 
by the undisputed testimony of appellant Wooley, the 
Lebanon chief of police, the presence of the motto on 
almost all passenger cars operates in the context of other 
classes of motor vehicles to determine, at least as an 
initial visual matter, whether the vehicle bearing a 
particular plate is properly registered within the class 
as indicated by the plate's markings.10 On the basis of 
6 I d. , at 36 . M r . Maynard offered into evidence an example of 
a bumper sticker he had fashioned p reviously and a ttached to his 
car, which to him conveyed a tenet of his religious belief. It was 
not directed at negating the motto on the license plat e. / d., at 33-
34, 36. 
1 I d ., at 36. 
' ~- H . Rev . Stat. Ann. § 260: 10-a (Supp . 1973). 
~ See n . 2, supra. 
10 Appellant Clar ke, D MV Commissioner , had explained that there 
were num erous special statutory categories of vehiclr,s, e. (J ., "ant ique" 
' , 
- -
6 WOOLEY v . MAYNARD 
this testimony and that of DMV Commissioner Clarke
1 
the District Court found that "the presence of the motto 
on the plates a.ids in the identification of New Hamp-
shire passenger cars." Ibid. 
The District Court first held tha,t appellees' "acts of 
covering the motto ... constitute symbolic speech within 
the meaning of Tinker [ v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969)] and Spence [v. Washington, 
supra]." Id., at 1387. Applying the four-part test 
enunciated by this Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U. S. 367, 377 (1968), set out in the mar~in,,11 the Dis-
cars, the license plates for which bore in lieu of the state moto a 
word denoting the registration category. By contrast to these spe~ 
cial categories, a patrolling officer could identify the overwhelming 
majority of passenger cars, displaying motto-bearing plates, as prop-
erly registered, at least as a matter of visual inspection. Appellant 
Wooley elaborated on direct examination by the State: 
"Q. If a piece of non-transparent tape appears across the top of a 
license plate, ... would you comment upon any difficulty you might 
have in identifying that vehicle? 
''A. Yes. The designation has been pointed out, such as the word 
commercial, tractor, trailer, antique, these are all visible means by 
which myself, as a police officer, would be looking for on a plate 
attached to any vehicle. There are numerous occasions where 
people use what we commonly refer to as a screwdriver transfer, 
where any set of plates or plate may be attached to a vehicle that 
is not assigned to that vehicle. The specific occasion that I per-
sonally was involved in was the use of ... a trailer plate attached 
to a motor vehicle . . . . The fact that the word 'trailer' was vis-
ible gave be an immediate indication that that plate did, in fact , not 
belong on a pleasure car . And without the words or some distin-
guishing marks, it becomes more difficult for a police officer to vis-
ually look at a ca r and a plate, or whatever the vehicle may be, and 
determine whether or not that plate may, in fact, belong on that 
vehicle." Transcript of Hearing, at 68-69. 
Chief Wooley was not cross-examined by appellees. 
11 " [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently 
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if 
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trict Court reasoned that the "communicative" interest 
furthered by the state motto was "directly related to the 
suppression of free expression within the meaning of 
O'Brien." 406 F. Supp., at 1388. It stated: 
"Although a government may perhaps single out 
certain messages for special protection when they 
appear on public property, see Spence [, at 408-
409] , Spence teaches that the governmental interest 
in preventing individuals from interfering with the 
communication of the state sponsored message by 
engaging in symbolic expression is not an interest 
tha.t meets the third requirement of the O'Brien 
test. " Ibid. 
As to the second, "functional" rationale-concededly 
unrelated to speech-the District Court held tha.t § 262:-
27-c failed the fourth tenet of O'Brien: "the defacement 
statute's effect on [appellees'] First Amendment free-
doms is certainly 'greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.'" Ibid. 
Since neither interest advanced by the State was 
found to justify the restriction on appellees' right of 
free expression, § 262: 27-c was in the District Court's 
view unconstitutional as applied to appellees. Appel-
lants were permanently enjoined from prosecuting ap-
pellees "for covering over that portion of their license 
plates that contains the motto 'Live Free or Die.'" Id., 
at 1389. 
II 
This remarkable decree is supported by reasoni ,1 g 
which to me represents either an unparalleled extension 
of Spence,12 a serious misapplication of O'Brien, or per-
haps both. 
expre,:;sion ; and if the incidental restnct1on on a lleged First Amrnd-
ment freedom,; is no greater than it; essential to the furtherance of 
t hat interest." 
1-:1 I ::iccept for purpOt;fS of a rgum ent thr essentially factua l ron-
'. 
, , 
"\ .,. - -
8 WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 
Accepting for the moment the proposition that New 
Hampshire's "communicative" interest in disseminating 
its motto is analogous to Washington's interest in pre-
serving the flag as a national symbol in Spence, 418 U. S., 
at 412-415, I have serious doubts whether the limited 
holding in Spence is controlling on these facts. First, 
license plates attached to cars driven on the public high-
way-aside from the question of actual title to such 
emblems-are hardly comparable to a "privately owned 
flag . . . displayed ... on private property." Id., at 
408-409. Since the communication occurs via the 
medium of property purchased from the State, this case 
is closer to those where the State has dedicated its prop-
,erty for a particular purpose and can thus restrain ex-
pression thereon by a neutral "time, place, and manner" 
regulation such as § 262:27-c. E. g., Cox v. Louigia,na, 
379 U. S. 536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U. S. 
39, 42 (1966). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975). If the rule in Cox and 
Adderly applies here, appellees' concession that their 
disagreement with the motto could be forcefully and 
legally conveyed by a homemade bumper sticker would 
appear to undercut substantially a.ny claim that a neu-
tral "place" regulation directed at the plate itself cannot 
be applied constitutionally to their competing choice of 
location. 
If Spence cannot be distiguished on this ground, affirm-
ance of the decision below extends Spence into areas 
which I do not think were contemplated by that court. 
Granted, the license plate here is not completely like "a 
flag that is public property ," 415 U. S., a.t 409, in that 
appellees have at least a possessory interest as against 
clusion of the District Court that appellees' act of covering t he 
motto with reflect ive tape "was sufficient ly imbued with elements of 
communicat ion to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments," and that t heir conduct was abo "symbolic speech/' 
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others. Nevertheless, this decision draws into question 
heretofore unquestioned prohibitions 13 against defacing 
"possessory" property like coin, currency, and passports, 
to name but a few. The Court today must be prepared 
to give serious consideration to a First Amendment claim 
that one who sincerely disa.greed on politica.l or religious 
grounds with the national motto "In God We Trust" 
could obliterate it from the face of a one-dollar bill.1• 
Similarly, strong feelings of "hawkish" political senti-
ment could apparently immunize one who blotted out 
the olive branch clenched by the eagle in the United 
States seal appearing on the passport. If by the District 
Court's holding the Federal Government no longer has 
the power to protect the communicative aspects of its 
official symbols appearing on such items from being 
wholly displaced by private citizens, then this Court 
should say so only after plenary considera.tion. 
But even if I am wrong in my reading of Spence, that 
case neither involved nor addressed the kind of "func-
tional" rationa.le for § 262: 27-c established by the State 
here. While the District Court made a finding that the 
motto's presence "aids in the identification" of properly 
registered vehicles, it thereafter rejected this concededly 
valid function as insufficient: 
"That the presence of this motto on the license 
plates is required for identification is belied by the 
fact that only passenger cars are required to have 
license plates that contain the motto 'Live Free or 
Die.'" 406 F. Supp. , at 1388 (emphasis added) . 
The shift in focus by the District Court obviously did 
not give full weight to the State's contention. As I 
have noted,1 5 it did not argue that the motto, any more 
than the words "New Hampshire," was the sine qua non 
13 E . g., 18 U. S. C. §§ 331-333, 499, 500, 1543, 1546. 
14 But see, e. g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 437-442 and n. 5 
( 1962) (Douglas, J ., concurring) . 
/0 15 See text and n.Jf, supra, 
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of its identification system. On the contrary, it estab-
lished its role as an "aid'.'-:-:-as one. element in the visul;ll 
authentication for some 325,000 New Hampshire regis-: 
trations. That showing cannot be so easiJy dismisf}ed 
under O'Brien. That license plate "fraud" is perhaps 
not overly rll,Illpant in that State does not minimize its 
substantial interest in mandating and preserving the 
identifying characteristics of what is, after all, the out-
ward sign of a license to use its highways. No orie 
would contend, for example, that a dollar bill would b~ 
any less recognizable as such were the words "ln God we 
Trust" inked out, but that would not gainsay Congress' 
power to protect, singly or in toto, each facial character,. 
.istic of that bill irrespective of the claim that a given 
"communicative" characteristic is not "required" for 
identification. I do not read O'Brien as so narrowly re-
stricting legislative ·power in this area. 
Since I believe that the District Court's decision can 
be upheld only by combining an extension of Spence with 





- ,~ (o- t7-7<c, Court Voted on . .. . . ... . .. . .. .... , 19 .. . 
Argued ...... .. .. . ..... . .. , 19 .. . Assigned . .. .... .... .. .. .. . , 19 . . . 









MERITS I MOTION 




····· ····· ···· · ········ ··· ·· ····· · · ·· A ···· 
Stevens~ J .. ............. ....... ... ... . ./1 .... . , .... , .... , .. .. , ... .. , .... , .... , .... ..... , ......... . 
Rehnquist, J . ........ . ..... .... • • • • • • • ji' · · • .,. · · · • · · · ·1• • • • 1• • • • • 1 • • • • 1• • • ·' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Powell, J ........ .. ... .. . ........... . /I .. ... , .. .. , .... , ... . , .. .. , ... . , .... , ... ... ... ,.••.•••••• 
Blackmun, J ..... .. ....... .. .. ..... . .. ] ...... · [· ... j ·/ '· ... , ... .. , ... . , .. .. , .. • • • • • • • • · · • • • • · · · 
Marshall, J ........ .. .. ............. . .......... . .... , .... , ..... , .... , .... • .. • • • • • •, • • • • • • • • · · 
White, J ... ......... . ...... ........... .. . ...... ... / '· ... , .... , ....•... , ... . ..... , ..... .. . . . 
Stewart, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
1
, . ... , .. .. , . ... • ... , .. ....... , . • • • • • • • • • 
Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · · V. · · · · · f · · · · · · · . . . . . . .. .. .. ........ .. . 




lfp/ss ll/'L'L/76 - -
November 22, 1976 
No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
This case is here on appeal from a three judge district 
court in New Hampshire (opinion by Coffin, J.), this is the 
New Hampshire automobile license case in which the appellees -
husband and wife - are Jehovah Witnesses who object on moral 
and religious grounds to the New Hampshire motto "Live Free 
or Die" stamped on noncommercial automobile plates. 
A New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor knowingly 
to "obscure . the figures or letters on any number plate 
attached to any motor vehicle II Appellees . persisted 
in masking the motto with reflective red tape. In addition, 
appellee Maynard later cut out the words "or Die" on all four 
license plates on appellees' two cars. Prosecutions followed. 
Maynard, just the husband, was charged and found guilty by 
the Lebanon district court on December 6, 1974. He was fined 
$25, but the fine was suspended. Maynard did not appeal. 
He was charged with a second violation, again convicted, 
fined $50, and sentenced to six months - with the imprison-
ment suspended. Maynard again did not appeal, advising the 
Court that because of religious beliefs he would not pay the 
fine. Thereupon, Maynard served 15 days of his sentence and 
was released. Thereafter, he was charged for a third violation, 
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second conviction. Sentencing was deferred, apparently 
pending the outcome of the second sentence. Again, no appeal. 
On March 4, 1975, about two weeks about being released 
from his 15 days in jail, appellees filed this suit in the 
U.S. District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, 
asserting First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. A 
three judge court was convened, and after an evidentiary 
hearing (together with a stipulation of some facts), the 
DC declined to abstain on Younger or Huffman . grounds. It 
therefore reached the merits of the constitutional issue 
and decided in favor of appellees on the ground that they 
had engaged merely in protected symbolic speech. 
The Younger/Huffman issue 
As noted below, I agree with the District Court on the 
merits. I have serious doubt, however, as to whether the 
District Court correctly applied our decisions with respect 
to abstention or equitable restraint with respect to a 
pending state proceedings. 
I would like for my clerk to focus primarily on this 
question. 
At the threshold , it is important to ascertain exactly 
what issues were invo l ved in the state misdemeanor trials, 
and what state remedies were available to appellees. 
The District Court relying primarily of Steffel and 






appellees were not seeking to enjoin a pending criminal 
prosecution; rather, their "primary objective [was] to obtain 
declaratory and injunctive relief against future arrests 
and prosecutions." The DC distinguished both Younger and 
Huffman, putting the latter aside in a single sentence: 
"Huffman, like Younger was a case in which 
granting the requested injunctive relief would 
have interfered with the processes of the state 
court by nullifying prior or pending state court 
proceedings. Here, no such interference can 
suit. Plaintiffs are not collaterally attacking 
Mr. Maynard's state court convictions. The 
relief they seek is purely prospective." 
Perhaps all of this is true, and yet New Hampshire makes 
a nonfrivolous argument to the contrary. 
The state's brief describes the New Hampshire remedies 
that were available to appellee Maynard. He was convicted 
in a district court. He was entitled, as a matter of right, 
to appeal and trial de novo by jury in the state superior 
court. The constitutional issue, which the state asserts 
Maynard did raise in his own defense, could have been 
"reserved and transferred without ruling [directly] to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court. Rather than pursuing any of 
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In footnote 6 of its opinion, the DC recognized that a 
"plausible" argument could have been made by Maynard to the 
effect that his state convictions bar litigation of the 
federal constitutional issues. But the DC went on to say 
that in the First Circuit "a state criminal conviction will 
have a preclusive effect in a federal civil rights action 
only with respect to matters actually litigated and decided 
at the state criminal trial." The DC's opinion (in note 6) 
continued: 
"Since the constitutionality of the state statutes 
was not litigated by Mr. Maynard in the state 
misdemeanor proceedings, collateral estoppel 
principles do not preclude this Court from con-
sidering this issue." (JS p. 28) 
The New Hampshire Attorney disputes the foregoing: 
"At the time of appellee Maynard's first appearance 
before the District Court, he raised a first amendment 
defense. (App. 30-32, Exhibit No. 3). He likewise 
raised a similar defense when appearing before the 
District Court to answer the second and third 
criminal complaints. (App. 30-32, 21 and 22). 
However, during the course of each trial Maynard 
elected neither to request the reservation and 
transfer of constitutional issues directly to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court nor to appeal his 
convictions to the Superior Court. Instead, he 
filed [this suit] with the U.S. District Court. 
. . . " (Appellant's brief p. 7) . 
I am dictating this at home, where I do not have the 
U.S. Reports. The New Hampshire brief quotes extensively 
from Bill Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman, and I must say that 
some of the quoted language appears strongly to support New 
Hampshire's position that federal intervention was inappropriate. 
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Quite apart from what was said in Huffman, it seems to 
me that the principles of comity and equitable restraint should 
apply in the circumstances of this case. Maynard has multiple 
state remedies available to him that he ignored. To be sure 
Monroe v. Pape - and its dubious progeny - state that exhaustion 
is not a prerequisite to a 1983 action. But Pape was not 
addressing a Younger or a Huffman situation where a state 
criminal or quasicriminal proceeding was actually in process. 
The doctrine of these cases can be too easily evaded if the 
criminal defendant need only fail to appeal before moving into 
a federal court. I have no read my dissent in Ellis v. Dyson, 
but certainly its rationale is relevant here. 
The DC did note that Mrs. Maynard, not a party to the 
misdemeanor prosecutions, was in a different situation from 
her husband as she was threatened with prosecution. I would 
like for my clerk to investigate the correctness and soundness 
of this "fall back" position. 
Merits 
If we reach the merits, I am presently inclined - rather 
strongly - to agree with the District Court that the compulsion 
to advertise a state slogan with which appellees profoundly 
disagreed was violative of First Amendment rights. The DC 
viewed this slogan as having "political" as well as religious 
overtones, and the case was decided solely on the first basis, 
i.e., appellees conduct was a symbolic manifestation of his 
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disagreement with the state's political views. The DC declined 
to reach the interference with religion issue. 
Although this seems to me to be an easy case, in view of 
some of the slogans on automobile licenses, some rather 
interesting cases may arise. What if Virginia put "Virginia 




November 22, 1976 
No. 75-1453 Wooley v •. Mavpard 
Dear Mike: 
,.~• Please take a look at the state's brief (appellants) 
in the above case, and see whether you think the printing 
complies with our Rules. 
The type may possibly be· in compliance, but I doubt 
that the "leading" between lines meets our requirements. 
I am dictating this llOte at home and do not have a copy of 
the Rules before me. But my recollection is that the pages 
of a brief must be properly leaded. 
I think you will agree that the solid pages of type in 
this brief are quite forbidding. 
New Hampshire, which is hardly impoverished, all.u filed 
a typewritten jurisdictional statement, which includes a 
single spacing_ of the District Court's opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. ~chael Ho4ak, Jr. 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Chief: I hope we will enlarge your crusade against excessively 
long briefs to apply our Rules more strictly with respect to 





To: Justice Powell 
From: Tyler Baker 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
Re: Wooley v. Maynard, No. 75-1453 
-
I. The Applicability of XH Younger v. Harris and related doctrines. 
App'ees argue that analysis is advanced if two questions are 
separated: 1) the appropriateness of federal intervention and 2) the 
equitable remedy to be used in the intervention, if it occurs. As 
the cases have evolved, I think that this approach is probably preferablE 
The appropriateness of intervention. It seems to me that the issue 
here is whether this case is closer to Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452 (1974), or to Huffman v. 1m Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Steffel 
held that intervention was appropriate (by way of a declaratory 
judgment) when no state prosecution was pending. Huffman held n 
that federal intervention.KIX was XHXXXXHXX~~RM inappropriate even 
in a civil proceedingMX (with criminal overtones) and eventhough the 
trial phase of the state proceeding was over, when the IrnX~ federal 
intervention was designed to "annul the results of a state trial." 
420 U.S., at 609. In the case before the Court JM three prior criminal 
prosacu! ion~ ha~ een ~ d, and t 12_o se convis,,tions are ,fi ~al. No appeals 
~.. z.w:a ..... 
were taken. The Younger concerns are only faintly present here. True, 
'-- --
the state appellate courts did not have a chance to rule on the claim 
made here, but the federal action:KX was not brought in such a way as 
to substitute the federal DC for the state appellate courts, as was true 
in Huffman. Mr. Maynard is in the same position that he would have been 
- -
in had the previous prosecutions not occurred. He still must choose 
41 between flouting state law or foregoing activity he believes to be 
constitutionally protected. Steffel, 415 U. S., at 462. Although 
appellants constantly speak of the federal intervention annulling the 
effects of the state ~KKHKlfiH prosecutions, there is no such effect. 
In all three prosecutions, the state had the opportunity to bring its 
-
-
filfXMnfili criminal justice apparatus to bear on app'ee Mr. Maynard. The -
state policies were presumably enforced and HllXHMX vindicated by the - ___..._,__ _ ---,, - - - .. 
sentences imposed. The federal actionXX was lffiHX not designed to 
~
affect the previous prosecutions. There may be a hint of denigrating 
the ability of the state appellate judges to enforce the constitutional 
rights of app'ees, but, in the main, the app'ants' argument here is 
an XM argument against the fact XHXX that there are .MtiX parallel court 
systems enforcing those rights. Tha arguments have almost as much 
bite against Steffel v. Thompson as against the present case. 
l 
Assuming that Mr. Maynard cannot invoke federal relief because of 
the Younger doctrine, Mrs. Maynard can. X~~XKMK App' '!:~ clearly have 
the better of the argument here. They pleaded for declaratory relief 
so the standard of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act applies. There 
is a real controversy between app'ees and Mrs. Maynard. One MXM difficu: 
ty here is that Mr. Maynard, if barred by Younger, would not be able 
to share in any relief that Mrs. Maynard obtained. Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). In a case of this type, involving two --
individuals with personal beliefs, the Dig suggestion from Doran 
that legally distinct lil{lfUK.K parties might be so closely related as 
to require the second to be barred by the Younger problems of the first 
is not applicable. My reading of Doran on that point is that the 
reference is to legally separate, but jointly owned corporations. 
Mixed with the~ arguments based on Younger and its progeny ~ liji:K 
- -
-
tt re, ar~~t i'V\ LJl\,+.s 
-a:p:p:=anc acg:ue that Mr. Maynard is barred from litigating the 
constitutional question MKfiliHX because of res judicata and collateral 
.. ~ t KKt{ estoppel. Res judicata was apparently not ~X raised as an ¥I ,affirmative defense and therefore was waived. Collateral estoppel 
was raised by motion and denied by the single DJ. See liji~~~X 
~~~Klq app'ees' Brief at 39-40 & n.25. App ' ees argue with some 
~3~ 
force that the question was not raised below. A C"A'$. spea1cs of the 
issue, but appears to believe that it was not presented by the app'ants. 
JS, App. at 28 n.6. The question was not presented as a question for 
review in the JS. I would recommend that the Court not address the 
question here. If it were addressed, I would agree with the CA that 
the constitutional question was not Xll~gK litigated below. JS, App., 
at 28 n.6. Even if collateral :MX~XM estoppel were appropria t e in a 
- case of this type, I would require a strong showing that it had actually 
been nxngern litigated. I don't think that Mr. Maynard's uneducated 
references to his religious beliefs equals litigation. 
A much more difficult question is the~~~ appropriateness of 
the DC issuing a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the 
statute against app'ees. This is the question left MfillK unanswered in 
Steffel . The hard question is whether the question is before the 
fhe,, .3.:rc.. 
Court. The question may not have been presented below. Ae::#$ states as 
follows: 
"Defendants do not dispute that the Younger doctrine permits 
federal injunctive relief against threatened arrests and 
prosecutions. Rather, they contend that Mr. Maynard is barrred 
by his failure to appeal any of his three state KMfffi 
convictions." XM J.S., App. at 27 . 
The ijMKKKXMfflc~~ Questions Presented refer only to the question of 
- federal intervention where a defendant has not exhausted his state 
appellate remedies. If app'ants had %MM.HHX contested the use of 
injunctive relief below, I would say that the question was naturally 
included in a J.S. dealing with the appropriateness of federal inter-
-
- -
vention. Under these circumstances, I do not think that the question 
is before the Court, unless it can be characterized as jurisdictional. 
My own reading of the cases is that the doctrine of equitable restraint, 
including the question of enjoining state proceedings, is a doctrine 
of restraint rather than jurisdiction. In Huffman Justice Brennan 
»~~~Xlrnxx» expressed the same understanding, but noted thatXX the Court 
addressed the Younger question, although it had not been pled in the DC, 
an action suggesting that it ~XK is jurisdictional. 
If the injunction issue is decided, the resolution depends on 
an evaluation of the »M~ abrasiveness XHXXMK for purposes of comity 
of a limited injunction as opposed to a declaratory judgment. This 
evaluation in turn depends on a consid/ation that the Court has not 
I\ 
squarely addressed to my knowledge, that is, just how strong is a 
- declaratory judgment in this situation. Does it have res judicata 
MXMXMIHH binding effect, or XXK is it little more than an advisory 
judgment. If the declaratory judgment is fairly strong, then the 
difference ll in abrasiveness may not be very significant. Steffel 
indicates, on the other hand, that one of the purposes of Declaratory 
Judgment Act was to avoid the friction caused by injunctions. It is 
possible to~ argue that an as-applied injunction is less abrasive 'f...... 
-
MJ f J..u-e.J ore a..cc.~ f l'.Lb it,., , If JJ >".Of I\~~ tllf '/ _ ~le,,-e_. 1-o 
clec/·, d ~ f-f,t-- 1 ue,,~ f', o Y\ of ll/11. '°V tA,ntJ, o Yt ba..rr11J f!:!i 
f ro~ecJ'i'oY\..s . 
-
- -
II. The constitutional merits. 
To the extent that conduct has toll clear a hurdle to qualify 
as symbolic speech, this conduct has cleared it. It was intended as 
a communication, and undoubtedly was understaod as a communication. -------This is KK~M especially so here where the conduct was the obscuring 
of words. Although the words are not completely unambiguous, the 
process of obscuring them quite clearly communicates disagreement with 
their message. I find it ~X~ rather easy to give content to the 
message and the MMX«R obscuring of the message: "Political freedom 
is more important than life itself" and "Political freedom is not 
more important than life itself." The fact that the message being 
communicated by app'ees is not a current subject of widespread XJG! 
attention is irrelevant to 1st Amendment analysis. When one KMHlilX 
4t considers this conduct in the context of New Hampshire, it undoubtedly 
conveyed a clearer meaning to those who saw the license plates than 
-
it does to us. One case involving a similar objection to the motto 
had been decided by the state supreme court, and the legislature had 
expressly considered the possibility of removing the motto. I think 
that the message was sufficiently particularized to qualify for protectic 
This case is not quite like any of the other cases involving 
symbolic speech in that the defendants here were, in a sense, 
"counter-punching" against a message being put out by the state. I 
5j IA a. re,/ y 
do not think that this case :XXXKK fallsAunder Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The XKf level of affirmation of belief 
bLJ~~ rf4uirt-ct, t-o u.~e...-
in ~ A license plates is quite different from that in being Jtl'I requirec 
to salute a flag and recite a pledge. At the :XX same time, there is 
an element of affirmation here, and it cannot be ignored. Although I 
am not sure how to fit it into the analysis, the element of affirmation 
adds a weight to the side of the defendants. This MI» difference 
1mnPrc11t-i:: .Tni::tice Rehnauist~ "time. olace. and manner" analvsis. which 
- -
- might be more persuasive if ordinary license plates (without a message) 
were the XH~i~ target of symbolic speech because, for example, the 
X]Qimt "speaker" hated the Dept. of Motor Vehicles. 
-
-
New Hampshire achieves its first goal of promoting history, state 
pride, individualism, and tourism by putting a philosophical/political 
message on the license plates. The only way that this could serve 
the statea purpose is by communicating something/ XfiliID<IX about the 
values of the state and her people. Interests of that kind were 
not sufficient in XK~iffl: Barnette. As Judge Coffin recognizes they were 
not sufficient in Spence v. Washington, 405 U.S. (1974), either. A 
flag communicates by MliK non-verbal X~ symbols certain values. Xfi~M 
Spence was not prevented from the using the flag to communicate his 
contrary~ opinions. See JS, App., at 36. Comparing this case to 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), XX I think it is fair 
to say that this E~li governmental interest is not unrelated to the 
suppression of fi free speech. This may just be a backward way of 
~H recognizing the impact of the affirmation of belief element here. 
The second goal of facilitating lflilillX~HXX vehicjle identification 
does not have the affirmation of belief problem, but, as Judge Coffin 
notes, it is quite easy to think of alternatives that do not involve 
the use of messages of this type. Short of going to a system that 
does not have the present problem, the }ix:X~ burden is on the state 
to adjust to 1st Amendment ~XMMMM.X problems. I again agree with Judge 
Coffin that the state failed the O'Brien test in that the nm incidental 
restriction of 1st Amendment freedoms is greater than essential to 
on~ 
the furtherance of the interest. Even whenAfocuses on the problems 
caused by the tape at th~resent time, the state loses, in my view. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), a case 
decided after O'Brien, the Court recognized that the symbolic speech 
-
- -
at issue there XMKXfil< (black arm bands) might cause some discipline 
~ problems. The Court XMlil'. held that, short of a finding of 
material and substantial interference with the requirement of 
appropriate discipline, the prohibition on the arm bands could 
not be sustained. 393 U.S., at 509. KXKMX Although there may be 
some minor problems of identifying the category of .IllMKXXll~ license 
plate here, I do not think that it rises to the level of justifying 
prosecution in this setting. 
The problem with currency is distinguishable, I think. There may 
be some difference in that money is not required to be displayed. 
Given the vast amounts on money in circulation, alternatives are not 
possible. And, most important, the impact of M.lilM defacing money 
goes far beyond the defacer, unlike the situation x.» with the license 
- plates, and may adversely affect confidence in the currency. The 
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1[March - , 1977] ~ 
MR. CHIEF J u sTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the /....o ().:~
1 
~ur~ ~---, 
The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hamp- a-,e ~ 
shire may constitutionally prohibit covering of the motto Q IA _ _ . ' ~ 
"Live Free or Die" on passenger vehicle license plates by in- / I'~ 
divi.dual licensees who find that motto repugnant to their V L J /. 
moral . and religious beliefs. /~ , 
• 
( 1) •. 
Since 1969 New Hampshire has required that noncornmer-t-i-~ 
cial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, ~.,f,;,._ 
"Live Free or Die." 1 N . H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ~ 263: 1. An-
other New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor "know-
ingly [to obscure] ... the figures or letters. on any number 
plate." N . H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 262:27-c (Supp. 1973). The 
term "letters" in this section has been interpreted by the 
State's highest court to include the state motto. State v. 
Hoskin, 112 N. H. 332, 295 A. 2d 454 (1972). 
Appellees George Maynard and his wife Ma.xine are fol-
i 
1 License plates are issueJ without the state mot.to for trailers, agri-
cultural v,ehicle;;, ca r dea ler,; , antique automobiles, t he Governor of New 
Hampshire, its Omgressional R.epresenta.tive;;, its Attorney General, Jus-
tices of the Stnte Supreme Court, veterans, chaplains of the State Legisla-
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lowers of the Jehovah 's Witnesses faith. The Maynards con~ 
sider the New Hampshire state motto to be repugnant to 
their moral. religious, and political beliefs," and therefore find 
it objectionable to disseminate this message by displaying it 
on their automobiles>' Pursuant to these beliefs. the May-
nards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their li-
cense plates.4 
On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation 
for violating N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:27-c. 011 Decem-
ber 6. 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon. N. H . District 
C'ourt to answer the charge. After waiving his right to coun-
sel. he entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to explain 
his religious objections to the motto. The state trial judge 
expressed sympathy for appellee's situation. but considered 
himself bound by the authority of State v. Hoskin, supra, to 
hold Maynard guilty. A $25 fine was imposed, but execution 
,:rns suspended during "good behavior." 
On December 28, 1974. Mr. Maynard was again charged 
with violating § 262:27-c. He appeared in court on Ja11u-
2 Mr. Maynard described his objection to the stnte motto: 
" [B]y religiou~ training and belief, I believe m~· 'govern111ent '-Jehov:1h'fl 
Kingdom-offer" everla,;ting life. It would be contrar>· to that, bPlief to 
give up 111>· life for the ~tate . even if it mea nt living in bondagr. Although 
I obey aJI law~ of thr Stc1tr not in confiict with 111>· cun,-cience, this ,;logan 
is directl>· at, odds witl1 my deep]>· held religious convictions. 
" ... I abo di~agree with th<' motto on politic:il grounds. I believe that 
life i,- morr precious than freedom ." 
Affidavit of George :\Iayn,ml. App. , a.t 3. 
8 At the time this ,:uit was commenced appellee~ ownrd two automobiles, 
:1 Toyota Corolla and a. Plymouth station wagon. Both automobile~ were 
registered in :t';'ew H amp,:hire where the :'.\fayrwrd,: are domiriled. 
• In ::\Ia)· or June 1974 :\Jr. ::\1:1>·1rnrd actua lly snipped the word,: " or Die" 
off tlw li cen~e plate:;, and thrn cover,ed the resulting hole, as well a:; the 
word:; " Live Frrr," with ta.pr. This was done, according to Nfr. Maynard, 
])Pcm1:;r nrighborhood children kept removing the tape . The Ma>·rwrds 
lt,we :; ince been issued new license plates, and h!lve ctisavowrd any intention 
()f phy~irally mutilia ti_nlf thPm, 
-
75-1453-0PINION 
WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 
-
3 
ary 31. 1975, and again chose to represent himself; he was 
found guilty, fined $50 and sentenced for six months to the 
Gra.fton County House of Corrections. The court suspended 
this jail sentence but ordered Mr. Maynard to also pay the 
$25 fine for the first offense. Maynard informed the court 
that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two 
fines. The court thereupon sentenced appellee to jail for a 
period of 15 days. Appellee has served the full sentence. 
Prior to trial on the second offense Mr. Maynard was 
charged with yet a third violation of§ 262:27-c on January 3. 
1975. He appeared on this complaint on the same day as 
for the second offense, and was, again , found guilty. This 
conviction was "continued for sentence" so that Maynard re-
ceived no punishment in addition to the 15 days. 
(2) 
On March 4, 1975, appellees brought the present action 
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Hampshire. They sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of N. H. 
R ev. Stat. Ann .. ~§ 262:27-c, 263 :1, insofar as these required 
displaying the state motto on their vehicle license plates. and 
made it a criminal offense to obscure the motto." On March 
11 , 1975, the single District Judge issued a temporary re-
straining order against further arrests and prosecutions of 
the Maynards. Because the plaintiffs sought an injunction 
against a state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality, 
a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
'C. S. C. § 2281. Following a hearing on the merits ,6 the 
'Appellant::; sought (a) injunctions again;;t future criminal prosecutions 
for violation of the -,tatutes and (b) an injunction requiring that in fut.ure 
yea rs the~· be is~ued li ccnsr plates that do not bear the state motto. 
<; Several months elfq1:;ed between the issuance of the temporary restra in-
ing or<ler and the hea ring on the merits. This delay was occa,;ioned by 
the reque:st of the State pending considera tion of a bill in the New 
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District Court entered an order enjoining the State "from ar-
resting and prosecuting [the Maynards] at any time in the 
future for covering over that portion of their license plates 
that contains the motto 'Live Free or Die.'" 1 Maynard v. 
Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (NH 1976). We noted prob-
able jurisdiction of the appeal. 426 U. S. 946 ( 1976). 
(3) 
Appellants argue that the District Court was precluded 
from exercising jurisdiction in this case by the principles of 
equitable restraint enunciated in Yeunger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37 (1971) . We reject this contention and hold that the 
District Court was not barred from enjoining further state 
prosecutions against either Mr. or Mrs. Maynard. In 
Younger v. Harris the Court recognized that principles of 
judicial economy, as well as proper state-federal relations, 
preclude federal courts from exercising equitable jurisdiction 
to enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. 401 U. S .. at 43-44. 
However, we have repeatedly held that "relevant principles 
of equity. comity, and federalism 'have little force in the ab-
sence of a pending state proceeding. ' " Steff el v. Thompson, 
415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974). quoting. Lake Carriers Association 
v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498. 509 (1972). Where no state 
prosecution is in progress but where a genuine threat exists, 
the Court has sanctioned the granting of both declaratory 
and injunctive relief "without regard to Younger restrictions." 
. ee Steffel v. Thompson, supra; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 
422 U. S. 922, 930-931 (1975). 
-VVe have held that, Younger principles aside, a litigant 
is en titled to resort to a federal forum in seeking redress under 
on passenger vehicle license plates optional with the car owner . The bill 
fa iled 10 gain enactment. 
7 The District Court refused to order the State of New Hampshjre to 
i~sue the l\faynards license plates without the sta te motto, although it noted 
that there was evidence on the record that New Hampshire cou ld easily 
do ~o. 406 F. Supp., at 1389. Seen. 1, supra. 
-
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42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of federal rights. 
Huffman v . Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 609-610, 11. 21 (1975). 
Mr. Maynard now finds himself placed "between the Scylla of 
intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forego-
ing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity 
in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in [ another J criminal 
proceeding." Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U. S., at 462. 
Under these circumstances he cannot be denied consideration 
of a federal remedy. 
Appellants point out that Maynard failed to seek review of 
his criminal convictions and cite Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. , 
supra, for the propositions that "a necessary concomitant of 
Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must exhaust hi s. 
state appellate remedies, before seeking relief in the District 
Court." 420 U. S., at 608, and that "Younger standards must 
be met to justify federal' intervention in a state judicial pro-
ceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his 
state appellate remedies," id., at 609. Huffman, however. is 
inapposite. There the appellee was seeking to prevent, by 
means of federal intervention , enforcement of a state court 
judgment declaring its theater a nuisance. We held that ap-
pellee's failure to exhaust its state appeals barred federal 
intervention under the principles of Younger: "Federal post-
trial intervention, in a fashion designed to annul the results 
of a state trial . . . deprives the State of a function which 
quite legitimately is left to them. that of overseeing t,rial 
court dispositions of constitutional issues which arise in civil 
litigation over which they h:we jurisdiction." 420 U. S. , at 
609 ( em phasis added). Here, however. the suit is in no way 
"designed to annul the results of a state trial' ' since the relief 
sought is wholly prospective, to preclude further prosecution 
under a statute alleged to violate Maynard 's constitutional 
rights. H e has already sustained convictions and has served 
a sentence of imprisonment for his prior offenses. 8 He does 
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not seek to have his record expunged, nor to annul any col-
lateral effects those convictions may have. e. g. , upon his 
driving privileges. The Maynards seek only to enjoin the 
State from prosecuting and sentencing either of them for 
future violations of the same statutes. Younger does not bar 
federal jurisdiction. 
We also reject appellants' arguments as to Mrs. Maynard. 
It cannot be seriously contended that as joint owner of the 
family automobiles she is any less likely than her husband to 
be subjected to state prosecution.n The District Court there-
fore properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction as to her also. 
Having determined that the District Court was not required 
to stay its hand as to either appellee, we turn to the merits of 
the Maynards' claim. 
(4) 
The District Court held that by covering up the state motto 
" Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plate. Mr. May-
nard was engaging in symbolic speech and that "New Hamp-
shire's interest in the enforcement of its defacement statute 
is not sufficient to justify the restriction on [appellees'l con-
stitutionally protected expression." 406 F. Supp .. at 1389. 
We do not view Mr. Maynard's conduct as symbolic speech 
and we see more appropriate grounds to affirm the judgm.ent 
of the District Court. 
t he District Court- found that "[n]o collateral consequences wiH attach as 
a result of it. unless M r. ::VIaynard is arrested and prosecuted for violation 
of NHRSA 262:27-c at some time in the future." 406 F. Supp., at 1384. 
~ We note t1rnt if the tota lit~· of the State's arguments were accepted, a, 
§ 1983 action could never be brought to enjoin state criminal prosecution& .. 
According to the State, Youuger principles bar Mr. l\tfa~·1rnrd from ,;eeking· 
an injunction because hC' ha.s already been subjec ted to prosecution. As to 
M rs. Maynard, the State argue,;, in effect, that thr action is premature 
because no such prosecut.ion has been instituted. Since the two ~pouses· 
were similarly situa.ted but for the fact- that one has been prm;ecuted and 
one has not, we fa il to sec where the St-a.te's argument wou-ld we!i leav~ 
].'OOJJl.. fw f~eral iQtervel),tion under a 1_983;._ 
-
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In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 ( 1968), the 
Court observed that " [ w] e cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' · 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby 
to express an idea." 391 U. S., at 367. To constitute sym-
bolic speech, conduct must not only be intended to communi- . 
cate, it must al~o be capable of conveying the intended mes-
sage to a substantial port.ion of those observing the conduct. 
In short it must be recognizable by the viewers as a form of 
expression. 
It is clear from our cases that both the subjective and the 
objective elements of expression must be present to trigger 
First Amendment protections. For example, in Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 410-411 (1974) the Court stated: 
"In Tinker [ v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 
503 ( 1969) J the wearing of black armbands in a school 
environment conveyed an unmistakable message about a 
contemporaneous issue of intense public concern-the 
Vietnam hostilities. Id., at 505-514. In this case. ap-
pellant's activity was roughly simultaneous with and 
concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and 
the Kent State tragedy, also issues of great public mo-
ment. [Citation] A flag bearing a peace symbol and 
displayed upside down by a student today might be inter-
preted as nothing more than bizarre behavior. but it 
would have been difficult for the great majority of citi-
zens to 'miss the drift of appellant's point at the time that 
he made it. 
" . .. An intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likeli-
hood was great that the message would be understood." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Covering the state motto on a vehicle license plate with 
tape is not within the range of the types of conduct the Court 
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the prominently displayed flag in Spence and the conspicuous 
black armband in Tinker, it is doubtful that the strip of tape 
placed on the license plate would attract significant notice. 
Even if noticed, the tape is hardly an unambiguous communi-
cative symbol; it could well be viewed as a safety measure or 
possibly as a colorful ornament. Even if some people were 
aware that a message was intended, it would be difficult in-
deed to understand "the drift of [appellees'] point." 418 
U.S., at 410. 
Unlike Spence and Tinker , there was no ongoing public 
controversy which would have helped make appellees' mean-
ing clear. While there were differences of opinion in the 
tate as to whether the motto should be required on vehicle 
license plates. it does not appear from this record that ap-
pellees' point of view was one shared by any significant num-
ber of others or even among Jehovah's Witnesses. Signifi-
cantly, when Mr. Maynard was asked why he covered the 
tate motto on his license plate, he responded: 
"A: The reason for it is that people will recognize what 
I am doing which is effective. A lot of people stop me. 
And one person says 'You can 't do that. That's agaillst 
the law.' I says 'Fortunately, I was given permission 
by the F ederal Court in a temporary injunction against 
the State .· And here I was able to converse with hinr 
and express my beliefs and my reason for doing so. And. 
so. th erefore. 1 was able to bear witness to the truth of 
God's kingdom." App .. at 29 (emphasis added). 
This suggests that the act of covering the motto was not itself 
intended to comm unicate, but rather was designed to attract 
attention of passers-by so that Mr. Maynard could then ex-
press his point of view. The symbolic speech doctrine does· 
not reach so far. l!nder that ratiouale virtually any bizzare 
or illegal conduct would be deemed symbolic speech so long; 
~s_ it_ werf' likeJy to stimulJ1te intei:est or inq_uiry .. 
- -
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The claim of symbolic expression is also weakened by ap-
pellees' prayer in the District Court for issuance of special 
license plates not bearing the state motto. See n. 5. supra. 
This is hardly consistent with the stated intent to communi-
cate affirmative opposition to the motto. Displa.y of such 
"expurgated'" plates would be substantially less communica-
tive even than Maynard's present practice of covering the 
motto with tape. 
(5) 
vVe turn now to what we view as the essence of appellees' 
objection to the requirement that they display the motto 
" Live Free or Die" on their automobile license plates. This 
is succinctly summarized in the following statement by Mr. 
Maynard in his affidavit filed with the District Court: 
"I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a 
slogan which I find morally, ethically religiously and 
politically abhorrent." App. , at 5. 
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State ma.y 
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the 
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on 
his private property in a manner and for the express purpose 
that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that thf' 
State may not. 
A 
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedon1 
of thought protected by First Amendment against state ac-
tion includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speakillg at all. See West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634, 645 ( 1943). 
A system which secures to all the right to proselytize religious. 
political. and ideological causes must also guarantee to each 
the concomitant right to decline to advocate such concepts. 
The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
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9ividual freedom of mind."· Id. , at 637. This is illustrated 
by the recent case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U. S. 241 ( 1974) , where we held u11constitutional a Florida 
statute placing an affirmative duty upon newspapers to pub-
lish the replies of political candidates whom they had criti-
cized. We concluded that such a requirement deprived a 
newspaper of the fundamental right to- decide what to pr.int 
or omit: 
"Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any 
newspaper that published news or commentary arguably 
within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editor 
might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid con-
troversy. Therefore. under the operation of the Florida 
statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted 
or reduced. Government-enforced right to access ines-
capably 'dampens the vigor aud limits the variety of 
public debate.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S., at 279.'' Id., at 457. 
The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state statute 
which required public school students to participate in daily 
"patriotic'' ceremonies by honoring the flag both ·with words 
and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior de-
cision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 
( 1940), the Court held that "a ceremony so touching matters 
of opinion and political attitude may [not] be imposed upon 
the individual by official authority under powers committed to 
any political organization under our Constitution." 319 U.S., 
at 636. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute in-
volved a more serious infringement upou personal liberties 
than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license 
plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as 
in Barnette, we are faced with a. state measure which forces 
all individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly 
w-hile his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument 
for advocating public adherence to an ideological point of 
- -
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view he finds unacceptable.10 In doing so, the State "invades 
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all 
official control." Id., at 342. 
New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that ~~LlD ~ 
use their private property as a "mobile billboard '' for the State's' - f y - -- _, 
ideological message-or suffer a penalty, as Maynard already 
has. As a condition to driving an automobile-a virtual 
necessity for most Americans-the Maynards must display 
" Live Free or Die" to hundreds of people each day. 11 The 
fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New 
Hampshire's motto is not the test; most Americru1s also find 
the flag salute acceptable. The First Amendment protects 
the right of individuals to nold a point of view differe11t from 
the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hamp-
shire commands, an idea that they find morally objectionable. 
B 
Identifying the Maynards' rights as ones protected by 
the First Amendment does not, however, end our inquiry. 
Even First Amendment rights may be limited where other 
compelling interests are at stake. See, e. (/. , O'Brien, supra, 
391 U. S. , at 376-377. We therefore proceed to examine the 
State's interest in requiring display of the state motto to 
10 I t i,; a rgued that the Maynards could simpl)• cli ,;play a la rge bumper 
sticker on their ca r voicing their di ,,-taste for the motto . Thi,;, however, 
would not alter the fac t that t hey would continue to disseminate. the poin t 
of view which they abhor . More pointedly, any such attempt at disagree-
ment would likely a ttract added attention to t)1e message t hey find 
tlistas teful. 
1 1 Some St.a.tes require t hat certain documents bea r the sea l of the State 
or some other official stamp for purposes of recordation . Such sea l migh t 
contain , albeit. obscure!~·, a symbol or motto having polit,ical or philo-
sophical implications. The purpose of such seal, however, is not to adver-
tise the message it bears but simply to authenticate the document by 
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determine whether that interest is sufficiently compelling to 
justify infringement of appellees' First Amendment rights. 
The two interests advanced by the state are that display of 
the motto (1) facilitates the identification of passenger ve-
hicles,12 and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individual-
ism and state pride. 
The State first points out that only passenger vehicles. but 
not commercial. trailer. or other vehicles are required to dis-
play the state motto. Thus. the argument proceeds. officers 
of the law are more easily able to determine whether passenger 
vehicles are carrying the proper plates. However the record 
here reveals that New Hampshire passenger license plates 
normally consist of a specific configuration of letters and 
numbers, which makes them readily distinguishable from other 
types of plates, even without reference to state motto.' ~ Evell 
were we to credit the State's reasons and "even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial , that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fund a~ 
mental personal liber.ties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be 
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the 
same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U . S. 479, 488 
( 1960) (footnote omitted). 
The State's second claimed interest is not ideologically neu-
1 2 The Chief of Poli ce of Lebanon, N. H ., testified that "enfo rcement of 
the motor vehicle laws is facilitated by the State Motto a.ppea ring on non-
commercial license plates, the benefi ts being the ease- of distinguishing New 
H amp:;hire licen:;e plates from those of similar colors of other Sta tes and 
t he eai,:e of discovering misuse of license plates, for instance, the use of a 
' trailer ' license plate on a noncommercial vehicle." Appellant's Brief at 20. 
18 New Hampshi re passenger vehicle license plat.es generally consist of 
t wo letters fo llowed by fou r numbers. No other license plate ca tegory 
displa~·s this combination, and no other eategor~· bea rs the state motto . 
See n. 1, supra. However, of the approximately 325,000 pas:;enger plates 
in New Hamp:;hire, 9,999 do not follow the regular pattern , di1,playing· 
numbers onl y, preceded by no letters. App., at 50-53 . . 
- - -
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tral. The State is seeking to communicate Lo others an official 
view as to proper "apprPciation of history. state pride. I a11dl 
individualism. ' · Of course, the State may legitimately pursue 
such interests in any number of ways. However . when:' the 
State's interest is to disseminate on ideology, however accept-
able to some. such int<-'rPst cannot outm"igh an individual's 
First Amendllwnt right to avoid becon1i11g the courier for 
such message." This is 11ot a case where the State has 110 
reasonable alternate means for dissemi11ating its message. 
There is almost an infinite variety of ways the State can em-
ploy to proclaim. its heritage of freedom and foster local pride. 
Nor is this a case involving a philosophica1ly neutral message 
informing of a Stat<' 's products or its tourist attractions or of 
the desirability of driving safely. Such messages would 
hardly raise comparable First Ameudmeut concerns. 
We conclude that the State of ="e\\' Hampshire may not 
:require appellees to display the state inotto 1· '· upon their ve-
hicle license plates, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
Affirmed. 
1 ·1 TllC' State doc:-:. not rxplain wh~- ad,·o(·:1t:~· of tlw:-:e vnlue::; i::; enhanced 
b~- di><play on privatC' citizen,: ' ('ar,,; !Jut :in· nut placPd Oil the car:; of the 
State officiab-the Governor , S11prrmc Court .111,:tirc,-, \Jembrr::; of Cou-
gre:;:-, ~heriffs , rt.c. Ser n. I, 11upra. 
'" It has been :suggested that toda~··,: holding \\'ill be read a~ ,-auctioning 
the oblitenition of the :\'at.ional :\Jotto, ·' fo Guel \\'e Trust " from United 
State~ coins a.nd cut-rene~·- That que,-tio11 i~ not bt'fore 11~ tod11~· b11t \\'C 
note that currcnc~·, which is pa,.><rd from hand to hand, differ,- in siguific:rnt 
respect,; from an a11tomobilr. \\·hieh is rradil~· as;uciated with its nperntor. 
Currenc_,· is genernll~· carried in n pur~r ur pocket and nred 11ot be di:spla~·ed 
to the public. The brare, of l'lll'rrncy i:; 1hu>< 1iot req11ired to p11hlic;Jy 
advertise the National Motto . 
- -
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... attlfitt-ghtl4 ~. <!J. 2.0gi)l., 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 10, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Jl 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -j;nprtntt (!Jonrl ttf iltt ~h j;bdt,g 
~a,g ~ , • QJ. 2llbi'!, 
March 1 O, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453, Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief, 
I should appreciate your adding the 
following at the foot of your opinion for the 
Court: 
Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the 
judgment of the Court and joins 
in all but part ( 4) of its opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 




C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR. 
-
;%u:p-trntt (Q:ourt of tlit ~nittlt ~htltg 
~as-lpngton. ~- (Q:. 20giJ1-~ 
March 11, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I too have difficulty with Part (4) although otherwise 
am glad to join your opinion. Part 4's discussiort of symbolic 
speech seems to me to be unnecessary to the resolution of the 
case since in any event, as you quite rightly point out in 
section (5), Maynard cannot be compelled by the state to dis-
seminate a message with which he disagrees. Moreover, I don't 
think I could agree with the resolution of the symbolic speech 
issue on the facts of this case; I would think that it is 
probably fairly clear to most people that Maynard's covering up 
the "Live Free or Die" slogan is his way of communicating his 
disagreement with the slogan. Accordingly, I'll join Potter's 
statement at the foot of the opinion if you feel that you pre-
fer not to delete Part 4. 
The Chief Justice 





March 11, 1977 
No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Chief: 
Although I do not disagree with what you say in 
Part (4) of your opinion, I agree with the view expressed 
by two or three of our Brothers that this part is unnecessary 
dicta. 
Putting it differently, it seems to me that you would 
have quite an excellent opinion if Part (4) were omitted, 
or if you simply dropped a footnote to the effect that in 
view of the disposition of the case on conventional First 
Amendment grounds, there is no occasion to reach the argument 
as to symbolic speech. 
I think your Part (5) is especially good. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
- -~u.prtnu <!Icurt cf tqt ~tit ~tafu 
'Dlaafriugtcn. F). <!t, 2llb'~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 11, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453, Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I, too, cannot join your Part (4). 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
- -~n:prtnu (!Jcnrl ltf t4t ~h .§taus 
jiaslp:ng~ ~. QJ. 2!1ffe)l.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
J U STICE WILLIAM H . REH N QU IST 
I / 
March 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
In due course, I anticipate circulating a dissent 
from Part 5 of your circulating draft. 
Sincerely/ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -;§u:pumt ~curt of tqt 'Jflniitlt ;§taus 
~lti'flpng-to1t, tl}. ~- 2.cibiJl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
March 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I am considering a partial dissent along 
the lines of the enclosed. 
Also, I have not come to rest with respect 
to Part (4) of your draft. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~-
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Mr. Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
Absent some explanation as to why an injunction as 
well as a declaratory judgment was necessary in this case, I 
cannot join Part (3) of the Court's opinion and hence dissent 
from the judgment insofar as it affirms the issuance of the 
injunction. 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), held that 
when state proceedings are not pending, but only threatened, 
a declaratory judgment may be entered with respect to the 
state statute at issue without regard to the strictures of 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). But Steffel left open 
whether an injunction should also issue in such circumstances. 
415 U.S., at 463. Then, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 
922 (1975), approved issuance by a federal court of a prelim-
inary injunction against a threatened state prosecution, but 
only pending decision on the declaratory judgment and only 
then subject to "stringent" standards which should cause the 
District Court to "weigh carefully the interests on both 
sides," since prohibiting the enforcement of the State's 
criminal law against the federal plaintiff, even pending 
final resolution of his case, "seriously impairs the State's 
interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the 
concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger." 
422 U.S., at 931. Although finding the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction not an abuse of discretion in that case, 
the Court also distinguished between a preliminary injunc-
tion pendente lite and a permanent injunction at the success-
ful conclusion of the federal case; for "a District Court can 
generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by 
entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger 
injunctive medicine will be unnecessary." Id. 
Doran v. Salem Inn thus did not decide the present 
injunction issue which the Court now disposes of in a sen-
tence or two. Doran was true to the teachings of Douglas v. 
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where the Court held that an 
injunction against threatened state criminal prosecutions 
should not issue even though the underlying state statute had 
already been invalidated, relying on the established rule 
"that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal 
prosecutions." 319 U.S., at 163. A threatened prosecution, 
l' - -
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"even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional 
guarantees, is not a ground for equity relief .... " Id. 
An injunction should issue only upon a showing that the -
danger of irreparable injury is both "great and iIIUTiediate," 
citing the same authorities to this effect that this Court 
relied on in Younger v. Harris. In· each of the cited cases--
and these do not exhaust the authorities to the same effect--
criminal prosecutions were not pending when this Court ruled 
that a federal equity court should not enter the injunction. 
"The general rule is that equity will not interfere to pre-
vent reenforcement of a criminal statute even though 
unconstitutional ... to justify such interference there 
must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an 
injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protec-
tion of constitutional rights." Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 
295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935). 
Under our cases, therefore, more is required to be 
shown than the Court's opinion reveals to affirm the issuance 
of the injunction. To that extent I therefore dissent. 
March 14, 1977 
- -~u:prtmt Qlourt of tqt ~nittb ~huts 
Jrasqiughm. ~ . <!j. 20ffe'l-~ 
CHAM BERS OP' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 14, 19 77 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Byron: 
I have your note of March 14 and the proposed partial 
dissent. 
I had thought that three arrests and one 15 day jail 
term showed that there was really more than a '' threatened'' 
prosecution. Here the state has shown an adamant 
attitude to unish "dissidents" and make an example of 
this fellow. I ad not ought more than a recital of 
the bare facts was needed to show this. In this respect, 
the case is distinguishable from those where the prospect 
of further prosecuti on ·was speculative. Alternatively, 
I would be willing to consia er a r firming only as to the 
declaratory judgment since that will give him his relief, 
Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S., at 931, provided this will 
satisfy you and not "frighten" off other votes. 
Regards, 
Mlj 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
- -~1q1untt (!Jmtri qf Hrr ~rb ~ taug 
~ aglpttghm, :!B. "t· 2llffe>¼' 
C H AMBERS OF 
JUSTI C E W I LLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
March 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your partial dissent in this 
case. 
Sincerely, 
I - - -.,. ., . 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
- -.§u:p-umc <!}ourl of t4.c *ttitdt ~mug 
~IUlJrhtgtott, ~. <!}. 2!lgf)!..;l 
CHAM B ERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN March 15, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I shall wait on Bill Rehnquist' s dissent mentioned 
in his note of March 14. 
Since rel 
11/t. 
The Chief Justice 




Referring to the exchange of correspondence between 
you and Byron, I agree with you that the prospect of 
further prosecution was not speculative, and would prefer 
to affirm both with respect to the injunction and declaratory 
judgment. , .. __ _ 
.... · • ¾ If, however, you need my vote for •·a Cour~ to affirm · · 




CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAU L S T EVENS 
-
.§npunu QJ:ltltti .o-f tip~ ~lt .§hdt.ll' 
:.-w.rJrutghm. ~. QJ. 2llffe.1!,~ 
March 15, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
. For the reasons you stated in response to 
Byron's proposed partial dissent, I agree that 
the prospect of further prosecution is not 
speculative and that it was not error for the 
District Court to enter an injunction. Indeed-, 
if you decide to reverse the injunction, you 
will "frighten" off my vote. 
Respectfully, 
Ji.. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ -w~c- ~ -
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
·/I# 'J- ~ rch 16, 1977 U,-C.~--4 c.--<.~ "441 • '--( 
f.o , ~  




We are ~e ~periencing the usual divers ±ty of 
views in First Amendment cases. ~
I have been awaiting the "lineup," and it now 
appears that the maximum "solidarity" can be achieved 
by deleting Part 4. Those to whom that part appeals 
may want to say- something- separately. --
I,therefore,call for a "show of hands" on 
deleting Part 4 and adding the following as Note 9 
page 8, line 5. 
In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 
463 & n. 12 (1974) we reserved the question 
of when a permanent injunction may be granted 
.,I 
in addition to declaratory relief. We conclude 
that such injunction was proper against the 
background of three prosecutions. The prosecutions 
enjoined here are for future, not past conduct. 
The rights implicated are protected by the 
First Amendment, and future prosecutions, 
even if unsuccessful, will have the effect of 
seriously interfering with appellees' freedom 
to drive their automobile. Three separate 
prosecutions of Mr. Maynard within the span of 
five weeks evidences sufficiently the State's 
determination to engage in vigorous enforcement 
of the statute--amounting virtually to harassment, 
cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
On this record the threat of additional future 
prosecutions is not speculative. 
/;Ard~ 
- -.:§u:prttttt ~on:rt cf fltt ~th .:§taitg 
'Jliag!p:ngbm. ~. ~. 2llffe~~ 
C HAMBERS O F / 
JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REH NQUIST 
March 16, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
Since I am on the dissenting side on the merits 
of the First Amendment issue in this case, my v i ews 
on the Steffel issue may not be of great interest to you. 
I do, however, feel that your response to Byron ' s draft 
dissent on the point is less than convincing, and I 
will therefore remain with Byron there. In the event 
that you go through with your announced plan to delete 
Part 4, I will in my dissent on the merits point out 
the fact that the Court's opinion has entirely omitted 
to pass on the First Amendment issue which the District 
Court decided, and _gone on to decide the case on a 
First Amendment issue which the District Court never 
considered. 
Sincerely,~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -~u:punu QJ!lltrl of tltr ~h ~faug 
'Jfrudpn~ ,. QJ. 2ilgtJ!., 
March 16, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 -- Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief, 
In response to your letter of today, I vote as 
follows: 
(1) In favor of deleting Part 4. 
✓ 
(2) In favor of adding the proposed Note 9, ex-
cept that I would eliminate the phrase "amounting 
virtually to harassment." I think it is inaccurate so 
to characterize the enforcement of the New Hampshire 
law, when the validity of the law had been explicitly 
upheld by the New ·Hampshire Supreme Court. 
The Chief Justice 







~u:prtmt <lfo-urt of tfrt ~tb ~taftg 
'Jlll'attfringLm. ~- <lf. 20.;iJ!.~ 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNA N . JR. 
March 16, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I "show my hand" both for deleting Part 4 and 
adding your suggested Note 9. 
The Chief Justice 




/· / C,(_ 
✓ 
- -
March 17, 1977 
No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
Omission of Part 4, with a statement (Note) that it 
was unnecessary to address the symbolic speech issue is 
fine with me. 
L 
Your proposed Note on Steffel also is agreeable : 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
- -~tqtrtmt <!toud of Urt ~tb ~taus 
'BasJrington. ~- <!f. 21lffe~~ 
CHAMBERS 01" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 17, 1977 
/ 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE B YRON R . WHITE 
- -
,juprtuU (!Jtmrl of tlrt ~h ,jtaua 0 
'Jlfas~ ~. QJ. 2.0.;rJ!., ~ -
March 17, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
Absent a remand to determine whether an 
injunction as well as a declaratory judgment is 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
-
CHA M BERS O F 
JU S TICE JOH N PA U L STEV E NS 
-
.£5upunu <!Jmtrl of Hr~ ~ub ,£5hdtll' 
.. agJrmghm. ~- QJ. 2.0.;i'1, 
March 17, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
✓ 
Please add my name to those who favor deleting 
Part 4 and adding the new footnote 9_. _Like Potter, 
I have a slight preference for omitting the word 
"harassment" but it is merely a preference. 
Respectfully, 
?-
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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2nd DRAFT AR 2, 1977 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 75-1453 
Neal R. Wooley, etc., et al., I On Appeal from the United 
Appellants, States District Court for the 
v. 
George Maynard et ux. 
District of New Hampshire. 
{March-, 1977] 
MR. CHJJDF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hamp-
shire may constitutionally prohibit covering of the motto 
"Live Free or Die" on passenger vehicle license plates by in-
dividual licensees who find that motto repugnant to their 
moral and religious beliefs. 
(1) 
Since 1969 New Hampshire has required that noncommer~ 
cial vehicles bea.r license plates embossed with the state motto, 
"Live Free or Die." 1 N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263: 1. An-
other New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor "know-
ingly [to obscure] ... the figures or letters on any number 
plate." N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 262:27-c (Supp. 1973). The 
term "letters" in this section has been interpreted by the 
·state's highest court to include the state motto. State v. 
Hoskin, 112 N. H. 332, 295 A. 2d 454 (1972). 
Appellees George Maynard and his wife Maxine are fol .. 
1 License plates are issued without the state mot.to for trailers, agri-
cultural vehicles, car dealers, antique automobiles, the Governor of New 
Hampshire, its Congressional Representatives, its Attorney General, Jus-
tices of the State Supreme Court, veterans, chaplains ,of the State Legisla-
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lowers of the Jehovah 's Witnesses faith. The Maynards con--
sider the New Hampshire state motto to be repugnant to 
their moral, religious, and political beliefs,2 and therefore find · 
it objectionable to disseminate this message by displaying it 
on their automobiles.3 Pursuant to these beliefs, the May-
nards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their li-
cense plates.4 
On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation 
for violating N. H . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:27-c. On Decem-
ber 6, 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon, New Hampshire 
District Court to answer the charge. After waiving his right 
to counsel, he entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to ex-
plain his religious objections to the motto. The state trial 
judge expressed sympathy for appellee's situation, but con-
sidered himself bound by the authority of State v. Hoskin, 
supra, to hold Maynard guilty. A $25 fine was imposed, but 
execution was suspended during "good behavior." 
On December 28, 1974, Mr. Maynard was again charged 
with violating § 262:27-c. He appeared in court on Janu-
2 Mr. Mayna.rd described his objection to the state motto: 
·'[B]y religious training and belief, I believe my 'government'-Jehovah's 
Kingdom-offers everlasting life. It would be contrary to that belief to 
give up my life for the state, even if it meant living in bondage. Although 
I obey all laws of the State not in conflict with my conscience, this slogan 
is directly at odds with my deeply held religious convictions. 
·' . . . I also disagree with the motto on political grounds. I believe that 
life is more precious than freedom." 
.\ffidavit of George Maynard, App., at 3. 
3 At the time this suit was commenced appellees owned two automobiles, 
a Toyota Corolla and a Plymouth station wagon. Both automobiles were 
registered in New Hampshire where the Maynards are domiciled. 
4 In .:\fay or June 1974 Mr. Maynard actually snipped the words "or Die" 
off the li cense plates, and then covered the resulting hole, as well as the 
words "Live Free," with tape. This was done, according to Mr. Maynard, 
because neighborhood children kept removing the tape. The Maynards 
have since been issued new license plates, and have disavowed any intention 
of physically rnutiliating them. 
-
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ary 31, 1975, and again chose to represent himself; he was 
found guilty, fined $50 and sentenced for six months to the 
Grafton County House of Corrections. The court suspended 
this jail sentence but ordered Mr. Maynard to also pay the 
$25 fine for the first offense. Maynard informed the court 
that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two 
fines. The court thereupon sentenced appellee to jail for a 
period of 15 days. Appellee has served the full sentence. 
Prior to trial on the second offense Mr. Maynard was 
charged with yet a third violation of§ 262:27-c on January 3, 
1975. He appeared on this complaint on the same day as 
for the second offense, and was, again, found guilty. This 
conviction was "continued for sentence" so that Maynard re-
ceived no punishment in addition to the 15 days. 
(2) 
On March 4, 1975, appellees brought the present action 
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Hampshire. They sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of N. H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 262 :27-c, 263: 1, insofar as these required 
displaying the state motto on their vehicle license plates, and 
made it a criminal offense to obscure the motto. 5 On March 
11, 1975, the single District Judge issued a temporary re-
straining order against further arrests and prosecutions of 
the Maynards. Because the plaintiffs sought an injunction 
against a state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality, 
a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 2281. Following a hearing on the merits,6 the 
5 Appellants sought (a) injunctions against future criminal prosecutionrs 
for violation of the statutes and (b) an injunction requiring that in future 
yea rs the~, be issued license plates that do not bear the sta te motto. 
6 Several months elapsed between the issuance of the temporary restrain-
ing order and the hearing on the merits . This delay was occasioned by 
the request of the State pending consideration of a bill in the New 
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District Court entered an order enjoining the State "from ar-
resting and prosecuting [ the Maynards] at any time in the 
future for covering over that portion of their license plates 
that contains the motto 'Live Free or Die.'" 1 Maynard v. 
Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (NH 1976). We noted prob-
able jurisdiction of the appeal. 426 U.S. 946 (1976). 
(3) 
Appellants argue that the District Court was precluded 
from exercising jurisdiction in this case by the principles of 
equitable restraint enunciated in Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 0 
37 ( 1971). In Younger the Court recognized that principles I 
of judicial economy, as well as proper state-federal relations, 
preclude federal courts from exercising equitable jurisdiction 
to enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. 401 U. S., at 43-44. 
However, when a genuine threat of prosecution exists, a 
litigant is entitled to resort to a federal forum to seek redress 
for an alleged deprivation of federal rights. See Steffel v.: 
Thompson, supra; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. , 422 U. S, 
922, 930-931 (1975). Younger principles aside, a litigant 
is entitled to resort to a federal forum in seeking redress under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of federal rights. 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609-610, n. 21 (1975). 
Mr. Maynard now finds himself placed "between the Scylla of 
intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forego-
ing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity 
in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in [another] criminal 
on passenger vehicle license plates optional with the car owner. The bill 
failed to gain enactment. 
7 The District Court refused to order the State of New Hampshire to 
issue the Maynards license plates without the state motto, although it noted 
that there was evidence on the record that New Hampshire could easily 
do so. 406 F. Supp., at 1389. Seen. 1, supra. 
-
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proceeding." Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U. S., at 462. 
Mrs. Maynard, as joint owner of the family automobiles is no I 
less likely than her husband to be subjected to state prosecu-
tion. Under these circumstances he cannot be denied consid-
eration of a federal remedy. 
, Appellants, however, point out that Maynard failed to seek 
review of his criminal convictions and cite Huffman v. Pursue, 
Ltd., supra, for the propositions that "a necessary concomitant 
of Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must exhaust 
his state appellate remedies, before seeking relief in the District 
Court," 420 U. S., at 608, and that "Younger standards must 
be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial pro-
ceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his 
state appellate remedies," id., at 609. Huffman, however, is 
inapposite. There the appellee was seeking to prevent, by 
means of federal intervention, enforcement of a state court 
judgment declaring its theater a nuisance. We held that ap-
pellee's failure to exhaust its state appeals barred federal 
intervention under the principles of Younger: "Federal post-
trial intervention, in a fashion designed to annul the results 
of a state trial . . . deprives the State of a function which 
. quite legitimately is left to them, that of overseeing trial 
. court dispositions of constitutional issues which arise in civil 
litigation over which they have jurisdiction." 420 U. S., at I (II' 
609 (emphasis added). ~ 
Here, however, the suit is in no way "designed to annul the 
results of a state trial" since the relief sought is wholly 
prospective, to preclude further prosecution under a statute 
alleged to violate Maynard's constitutional rights. He has 
already sustained convictions and has served a sentence of im-
prisonment for his prior offenses.8 He does not seek to have 
8 As to the offense which was "continued for sentencing," see p. 3, supra, 
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his record expunged, nor to annul any collateral effects those 
convictions may have, e. g., upon his driving privileges. The' 
Maynards seek only to be free from prosecutions for future 
violations of the same statutes. Younger does not bar federal 
jurisdiction. 
In their complaint, the Maynards sought both declaratory 
and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the New 
~ampshire statute. We have recognized that although 
" ' [ o] rdin~rily . . . the practical effect of [injunctive and 
declaratory] relief will be virtually identical.' " Doran v. Salem 
Inn, mpra, 422 U. S., at 931 , quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 
401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) , a, "district court can generally protect 
the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory 
judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will 
be unnecessary." Doran, supra, at 931. It is correct that 
generally a court will not "enjoin the enforcement of a crimi-
nal statute even though unconstitutional," Spielman Motor 
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935), since "[s]uch a result 
seriously impairs the state's interest in enforcing its criminal 
laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at 
the heart of Younger," Doran, supra, 422 U. S., at 931. But 
this is not an absolute policy and in some circumstances in-
junctive relief may be appropriate. "To justify · such inter-
ference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear 
showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford 
adequate protection of constitutional rights." Spielman Mo-
tor Co., supra, 295 U. S. , at 95. 
We have such a situation here for as we have noted , three 
successive prosecutions were undertaken against Mr. May-
nard in the span of five weeks. The threat of repeated pros-
ecutiops in the future against both him and his wife. and 
the effect of such a continuing threat on their ability to per-
_form the ordinary tasks of daily life which require an auto-
a Teimlt of it unless Mr. Maynard is arrested and prosecuted for violation 
of NHRSA 262:27-c at some time in the future. " 406 F. Supp., at 1384. 
-
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mobile, is sufficient to justify injunctive relief. Compare 
.Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). We are 
therefore unwilling to say that the District Court was limited 
1
to granting declaratory relief. Having determined that the 
District Court was not required to stay its hand as to either 
appe}lee n we turn to the merits of the Maynard's claim. 
(4) 
The District Court held that by covering up the state motto 
'·'Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plate, Mr. May-
nard we..s engaging in symbolic speech and that "New Hamp-
shire's interest in the enforcement of its defacement statute 
• is not sufficient to justify the restriction on [appellees'] con-
stitutionally protected expression." 406 F. Supp., at 1389. 
We find it unnecessary to pass on the symbolic expression 
issue, :for we find more appropriate First Amendment grounds 
for afnmiing the judgment of the District Court.10 We turn 
IijSte.ad to what in our view is the essence of appellees' 
~bje~tj.on to the requirement that they display the motto 
9 We note that if the totality of the State's arguments were accepted, a 
§ 1983 adtion could never be brought to enjoin state criminal prosecutions. 
According to the State, Younger principles bar Mr. Maynard from seeking 
an injunetion because he has already been subjected to prosecution. As to 
Mrs. Maynard, the Stat€ argues, in effect, that the action is premature 
becaU66 no such prosecution has been instituted. Since the two spouses 
were similarly situated but for the fact that one has been prosecuted and 
one ~ not, we fail to see where the State's argument would ever leave 
room for federal intervention under § 1983. 
10 We note that appellees' claim of symbolic expression is substantially 
undermined by their prayer in the District Court for issuance of special 
license plates not bearing the state motto . See n. 5, supra. This is 
hardly consistent with the stated intent to communicate affirmative op-
position to the motto. Whether or not we view appellee's present pra.ctice 
of covering the motto with tape as sufficiently communicative to sustain 
a claim of symbolic expression, display of the "axpurgated" plates re-
quested l)y appellees would surely not sa.tisfy that standard. See n. 1, 
supra; Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 41~11 (1974), United 






WOOLEY v. MAYNARD 
-
"Live Free or Die" on their automobile license plates. This 
is succinctly summarized in the following statement by Mr. 
Maynard in his affidavit filed with the District Court: 
"I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a 
slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and 
politically abhorrent." App., at 5. 
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may 
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the 
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on 
his private property in a manner and for the express purpose 
that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the 
State may not. 
A 
We begin with the prqposition that the right of freedom 
of thought protected by First Amendment against state ac-
tion includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all. See West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634, 645 ( 1943), 
A system which secures to all the right to proselytize religious, 
political, and ideological causes must also guarantee to each 
the concomitant right to decline to advocate such concepts. 
The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of the broader concept of "in-
dividual freedom of mind." Id. , at 637. This is illustrated 
by the recent case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo , 
418 U. S. 241 (1974) , where we held unconstitutional a Florida 
statute placing an affirmative duty upon newspapers to pub-
lish the replies of political candidates whom they had criti-
cized. We concluded that such a requirement deprived a 
newspaper of the fundamental right to decide what to print 
or omit: 
"Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any 
newspaper that published news or commentary arguably 
within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors 
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troversy. Therefore. under the operation of the Florida 
statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted 
or reduced. Government-enforced right to access ines-
capably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of 
public debate.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S., at 279." Id., at 457. 
The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state statute 
which required public school students to participate in daily 
"patriotic" ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words 
and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior de-
cision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 
( 1940) , the Court held that "a ceremony so touching matters 
of opinion and political attitude may [not] be imposed upon 
the individual by official authority under powers committed to 
any political organization under our Constitution." 319 U. S .. 
at 636. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute in-
volved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties 
than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license 
plate. but the difference is not significant in terms of com- , 
munication of the State's message. Here, as in Barnette, 
we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual. 
as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his automo-
bile is in public view- to be an instrument for advocating' 
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds un- p ~ 
acceptable. In doing so, the State " invades the sphere of ' " q 
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." 
Id. , at 342. 
New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees 
use their private property as a "mobile billboard" for the State's 
ideological message-or suffer a penalty, as Mayna.rd already 
has. As a condition to driving an automobile-a virtual 
necessity for most Americans-the Maynards must display 
"'L1ve Free or Die'' to hundreds of people each day .11 The 
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fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New 
Hampshire's motto is not the test; most Americans also find 
the flag salute acceptable. The First Amendment protects 
the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from 
the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way ~ew Hamp-
shire commands, an idea that they find morally objectionable. 
B 
Identifying the Maynards' rights as protected by the First 
Amendment does not end our inquiry however. Even First 
Amendment rights may be limited where other compelling 
interests are at stake. See, e. g., O'Brien, supra, 391 U. S. , 
at 376-377. We therefore proceed to examine the State's 
interest in requiring display of the state motto to deter-
mine whether that interest is sufficiently compelling to justify 
infringement of appellees' First Amendment rights. The 
two interests advanced by the state are that display of the 
motto ( 1) facilitates the identification of passenger vehicles,1 2 
and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individualism and 
state pride. 
The State first points out that only passenger vehicles, but 
not commercial, trailer, or other vehicles are required to dis-
play the state motto. Thus, the argument proceeds, officers 
of the law are more easily able to determine whether passenger 
vehicles are carrying the proper plates. However the record 
here reveals that New Hampshire passenger license plates 
or some other official stamp for purposes of recordation. Such seal might 
conta.in, albeit obscure!~·, a symbol or motto having political or philo-
~ophical implications. The purpose of such sea l, however, is not to adver-
tise the message it bears but simply to authenticate the document by 
~hawing the authority of its origin. 
12 The Chief of Poli re of Lebanon, N. H ., testified that "enforcement of 
the motor vehicle laws is facilitated by the State Motto appearing on non-
C'ommercial license plates, the benefits being the ease of distinguishing New 
Hampshire license plates from those of similar colors of other States and 
the ·ease of discovering misuse of license plates, for instance, the use of a 
·trailer' license plate on a nonrommrrcial vehicle." Appellant's Brief at 20, 
-
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lt 
normally consist of a specific configuration of letters and 
numbers, which makes them readily distinguishable from other 
types of plates, even without reference to state motto. 1 ~ Even 
were we to credit the State's reasons and "even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be 
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the 
same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 
(1960) (footnote omitted). 
The State's second claimed interest is not ideologically neu-
tral. The State is seeking to communicate to others an official 
view as to proper "appreciation of history, state pride, [and] 
individualism." Of course, the State may legitimately pursue 
such interests in any number of ways. However, where the 
State 's interest is to disseminate an ideology, however accept-
able to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's 
First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for I ~ 
such message.14 U\ 
We conclude that the State of New Hampshire may not 
require appellees to display the state motto 1 5 upon their ve-
13 New Hampshire passenger vehicle license plates general!~· consist of 
two letters followed by four numbers. No other license plate category 
displays this combination, and no bther category bears the state motto . 
See n. 1, supra . However, of the approximately 325,000 passenger plates 
in New Hampshire, 9,999 do not follow the regular pattern, displaying 
numbers only, preceded by no letters. App ., at 50-53. 
11 The State does not explain why advocary of these values is enhanced 
by display on private citizen,;' cars but not on the can; of the State I 
officials-the Governor , Supreme Court Justices, Members of Congres:;, 
sheriffs, etc. Seen. 1, supra. 
1 5 It has been :;u1,?:gested t lrn t today's holding will be read as sanctioning 
the obliteration of the National ::viotto, "In God we Trust" from United 
'States coins and currency. That question is not before us today but we 
note that currency, which is pa;;secl from hand to hand, differs in significant 
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hicle license plates, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the . District Court. 
Affirmed, 
Currency is generally carried in a pur:;e 01· pocket and need not be displayed 
to the public. The bearer of currency is thus not required to publicly 
advertise the National Motto. 
- -
.§nprttttt <qo-mt !lf tlrt 1tttilt~ ~htf:tg 
.,.w.rlym.ghm. ~. <q. 2.0ffe'!,J 
CHAMBE R S OF 
JUST ICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 24, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
I reconfirm my join. 
Respectfully, 
)i, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.:§npumt ~ottrl of tltt ~~ ;§taus 
JfiullfingLtn. l0, ~- 2.Cl.;r'-1, 
March 22, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I 
Enclosed is what I hope is the final draft of 
the opinion in this "sticky" little case. It is 
not feasible to meet every nuance of each of nine 
conceptions of the First Amendment but I have now 
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CHAMl!IERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 28. 1977 / 
Re: No. 75-1453, Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
Please show me as concurring in the judgment. 
Sincerely. 
;;tit( . . 
T.M. 
The Chief Justice 




-To : The Chi ef Jus t ice 
Mr. Just i ce Br ennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr . Jm:rt:l.ce Blackmun 
,/4. Justice Powell 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
Frorn : Mr. Just ice White 
Circulated : 3 - ~ - 77 
Recirculated: ___ --J-. __ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-1453 
eal R. Wooley, etc., et al,, 
Appellants, 
v. 
· George Maynard et ux, 
On Appeal from the Uniteg 
States District Court for the 
District of New Ha~p§hir~, 
[April - , 1977] 
MR. J u sTICE WHITEJ, concurring in pa:rt and (iiss~nting in 
part . 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 ( 1974) , he.Id that when 
state proceedings are not pending, but only threatened, a 
declaratory judgment may be entered with respect to the 
state statute at issue without regard to the strictures of 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). But Steffel left 
open whether an injunction should also issue in such cir-
cumstances. 415 U. S., at 463. Then, Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975) , approved issuance by a federal 
court of a preliminary injunction against a threatened state ' 
prosecution , but only pending decision on the declaratory 
judgment and only then subject to "stringent" standards 
which should cause the District Court to "weigh carefully the 
interests on both sides," since prohibiting the enforcement of 
the State's criminal law against the federal plaintiff, even 
pending final resolution of his case, "seriously impairs the 
State 's interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates 
the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger." 
422 U. S., at 931. Although finding the issuance of a pre~ 
liminary injunction not an abuse of discretion in that case, the 
Court also distinguished between a preliminary h1junction 
pendente lite and a permanent injunction at the successful 
·conclusion of the federal case; for "a District Court can gen-
erally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a 
I 1·- -·· .. -
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declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive 
medicine will be unnecessary." Ibid. 
Doran was thus true to the teachings of Douglas v. Jean-
nette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), where the Court held that an 
injunction against threatened state criminal prosecutions 
should not issue even though the underlying state statute had 
already been invalidated, relying on the established rule 
"that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal 
prosecutions." 319 U. S., at 163. A threa.tened prosecution 
"even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional 
guarantees, is not a ground for equity relief .... " Ibid. An 
inj unction should issue only upon a showing that the danger 
of irreparable injury is both "great and immediate," citing 
the same authorities to this effect that this Court relied on in 
Younger v. Harris. In each of the cited cases-and they 
do not exhaust the authorities to the same effect-criminal 
prosecutions were not pending when this Court ruled that a 
federal equity court should not enter the injunction. "The 
general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent 
enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitu-
tional ... to justify such interference there must be excep-
tional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction 
is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of consti-
tutional rights." Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 
89, 95 ( 1935). 
The Court has plainly departed from the teaching of these 
cases. The whole point of Douglas v. Jeannette's admonition 
against injunctive relief was that once a declaratory judg-. 
ment had issued, further equitable relief would depend on 
the existence of unusual circumstances thereafter. Here the 
State's enforcement of its statute . prior to the declaration of 
unconstitutionality by the federal court would appear to be 
no more than the performance of their duty by the State's 
law enforcement officers. If doing this much prior to the 
declaration of unconstitutionality amounts tQ unusual cir..: 
.,._..\. .... ,.. -
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cumstances sufficient to warrant an injunction, the standard 
is obviously seriously eroded. 
Under our cases, therefore, more is required to be shown 
than the Court's opinion reveals to affirm the issuance of the 
inj unction. To that extent I dissent, 
- -~ttJfl"tmt Qitturl ttf t~t 'J!lnittb j;tatts 
11las4ittgfon. ~- QI. 21lffe~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 1. 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief: 
With your permission, I will withdraw my 
concurring in the result to please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTI C E W I LLIAM H . RE H NQUIST I 
March 30, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your separate opinion circulated 
March 30th. I am also preparing a separate dissent on 
the merits, which I hope to have in circulation early next 
week. 
Mr. Justice White 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-1453 
Neal R. Wooley, etc., et al.,) 0 A 1 f h U . d - · · A 11 t n ppea rom t e mte ppe ans, . . h · States District Court for t e 
v. District of New Hampshire. 
p-egr~e Maynard et ux. 
[April -, 1977] 
MR: JusTICE REHNQUI§T, dis~enting. 
The Court holds that a State is barred by the Federal 
Constitution from displaying the state motto on a state li-, 
cense plate. The path that the Court travels to reach this 
result demonstrates the difficulty in supporting it. The Cour~ 
holds that the required dispiay of the motto is an unconstitu-
tional "required affirmation of beiieC' The District Court~ 
however, expressiy refused to consider this contention, and 
noted that, in an analogous case, a decision of the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire had reached precisely the opposite 
result. See State v. Hoskin, 112 N. H. 332, 295 A. 2d 454 
( 1972) . The District Court found for appellees on the 
gr•ound that the obscuring of the motto was protected "sym-
bolic speech." This Court, in relying upon a ground ex-
pressiy avoided by the District Court, appears to disagree 
with the ground adopted by the District Court; indeed 
it points out that appellees; claim of symbolic expression has 
been "substantially undermined" by their very complaint in 
this action. Ante, at 7 n. 10. 
I not only agree with the Court's implicit recognition that 
there is no protected "symbolic speech" in this case, but I 
think that that conclusion goes far to undermine the Court's 
ultimate holding that there is an element of protected expres.;. 
sivn here. The State has not forced appellees to "say" any-
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nonverbal actions reasonably likened to "speech," such as 
wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or 
waving a flag as a symbolic gesture. The State has simply 
required that all 1 noncommercial automobiles bear license 
tags with the state motto, "Live Free or Die." Appellees 
have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are 
simply required by the State, under its police power, to carry 
a state auto license tag for identification and registration 
purposes. 
In Part ( 4) A, the Court relies almost solely on West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 
(1943). The Court cit,es Barnette for the proposition that 
t here is a constitutional right, in some cases, to "refrain from 
speaking." Ante, at 8. What the Court does not demon-
strate is that there is any "speech" or "speaking" in the con-
text of this case. The majority also relies upon the "right 
to decline to advocate [religious, political, and idealogical] 
concepts." Ibid. But such a statement begs the question . 
The issue, unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, 
in displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, 
t he format of which is known to all as having been prescribed 
by the State, would be considered to be "advocating" political 
or idealogical views. 
T he Court recognizes, as it must, that this case substan-
tially differs from Barnette, in which school children were 
forced to speak the pledge of allegiance while giving the flag 
salute. Ante, at 9. However, the majority states "the dif-
ference is not significant in terms of the communication of the 
State's message." Ibid. Certainly this cannot be the test. 
'Were New Hampshire to erect a multitude of billboards, each 
proclaiming "Live Free or Die," and tax all citizens for the 
cost of erection and maintenance, clearly the message would 
be "communicated" in the sense described by the majority, 
1 See ante,. at 1 n. 1 fo r de minimis exceptions, 
-
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and just as clearly the individual citizen-taxpayers would be 
"instruments," see ibid., in that communication. However, 
in that case, as in this case, there is no affirmation of belief. 
For First Amendment principles to be implicated, the State 
must place the citizen in the position of, or of appearing to, 
"assert as true" the message. This was the focus of Barnette, 
and clearly distinguishes this case from that one. 
In holding that the New Hampshire statute does not run 
afoul of our holding in Barnette, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court in Hoskin, supra, 295 A. 2d, at 457, aptly articulated 
why there is no required affirmation of belief in this case! 
"The defendants' membership in a class of persons re-
quired to display plates bearing the State motto carries 
no implication and is subject to no requirement that they 
indorse that motto or profess to adopt it as a matter of 
belief." 
As found by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Hoskin, . 
there is nothing in state law which precludes appellees from 
displaying their disagreement with the state motto as long 
as the methods used do not obscure the license plates. Thus 
appellees could place on their bumper a conspicuous bumper 
sticker explaining in no uncertain terms that they do not 
profess the motto "Live Free or Die" and that they violently 
A isagree/ with the connotations of that motto. Since any 
implication that they affirm the motto can be so easily dis-
placed, I cannot agree tha.t the sta.te statutory system for · 
motor vehicle identification and tourist promotion may be 
invalidated under the fiction that appellees are unconstitu-
tionally forced to affirm, or profess belief in, the state motto. 
The logic of the Court's opinion leads to startling, and I 
believe totally unacceptable, results. For example, the mottos 
" In God We Trust" and "E pluribus unum" appear on the 
coin and currency of the United States. I cannot imagine, 
that the statutes. see 18 U. S. C. §§ 331 and 333, proscribing 
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ment rights of an atheist. The fact that an atheist carries :// 
and uses U. S. currency does not, in any meaningful sense; 
convey any affirmation of belief on his part in the motto "In 
God We Trust." Similarly, there is no affirmation of belie£ 
involved with the display of state license tags upon the private 
a:.utomobiles involved here. 
I i woukt rever~ the judgll}~~t of the District Court, 
¥ .. , ¥ ..,, J \,, • '- . . ... . 
2 Of course it is t rue that an atheist is not required to carry or use U. S. 
currency; barter, for example, is an a.lternative. Similarly, and with. no 
less inconvenience, the appellees may seek other modes of transportation. 
- -.§uprtmt Q}irnrl ttf f:lrt ~th ~hmg 
~asfrittghm. lll. (!}. ZOffeJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQU IST 
April 6, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Byron: 
I think Harry's letter to you of April 6th is 
probably a sounder analysis of our relationship, as 
dissenters on the merits, to your partial dissent, 
than was my simple "join" letter to you earlier. It 
would please me,, too, therefore, if you could make the 
change which Harry suggests in his letter of April 6th. 
Sincerely, 
i1..1vvJ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
THE CH I EF JUSTIC E 
- -~u:p-rrmt <qourt of tlrt ~niftb .f§ta.tts 
~as!rhtgton. g). <q. 20.;rJ!.~ 
April 14, 1977 
Re: 75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Potter; 
I have your note ot earlier today. 
✓ 
It seems to me there are no differences but only semantical 
variations. I am quite willing to modify the first 8 lines of 
part B, page 10, to read: 
"B 
"Identi~ying the Maynards• interests as implicating 
·;First Amendment protections does not end our inquiry 
however. We must also determine whether the State's 
interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring 
that appellees display the State motto on their license 
plates, See, e.g., 0 1 B'r'ien, · ·s ·u·pra, 391 u.s,, at 376-
377 ... 
I as~ume this will meet your P,roblem and I hardly think 
the change will disturb· any of the/"joins." 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
oJ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
Dear Chief, 
-.:§u:prtmt Q}.tlltrl cf tlrt ~b ~htu.G 
~rut' !yhtghm. ~. QJ. 2!TbiJ1., 
/ 
April 14, 1977 
75-1453 -- Wooley v. Maynard 
I cannot agree that any state or federal interest could 
ever justify "infringement" of First Amendment rights. For 
this reason I am not able to join your proposed opinion as re-
circulated April 13, with the additional sentence in the first 
full paragraph under "B" on page 10. John Harlan and I for 
many years carried on a continuing off-the-record dialogue 
on this subject. While he thought, probably quite rightly, 
that my view was no more than semantic and probably circu-
lar, he nonetheless came to agree with it. In short, this 
view is simply that sometimes interests in free expression 
must be subordinated to strong societal policies, but that in 
such situations there is no infringement of First Amendment 
rights. Because of this view, I also have trouble with the 
first two sentences of the paragraph in question, because of 
their use of the word "rights. 11 
The Chief Justice 




CHAMB ERS O F 
J USTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -~uµuntt ~ottrl 1lf tltt ~b .§htf.eg 
~ M ltingfon, ~. <!f. 2ll.?'1 ~ 
April 15, 1977 
75-1453 - Wooley v. Maynard 
Dear Chief, 
The changes in language suggested in 
your letter of April 14 serve to meet my prob-
lem. If these changes are made, I shall be 
glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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April 18, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 75-1453 Wooley v. Maynard 
/ 
I can have Wooley ready for Wednesday, since 
Bill Rehnquist has adjusted his dissent to my language 
changes. 
We have so few cases this week I suggest that 
any one "dissent" will lead me to lay it over. 
Regaru/2 () 
• • • 
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